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AUTHOR 


HUDSON,  W.  H. 


TITLE: 


HERBERT  SPENCER 


PLACE: 


NEW  YORK 


DATE: 


[  1 909] 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 


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Restrictions  on  Use: 


Spencer,  Herbert,  1020-1903 


1 


Hudson,  WUliam  Henry,  1862-,1918. 

Herbert  Spencer,  by  William  Henry  Hudson,    Lcmdon, 

A7-Constable-&-co.j  ltd.,rl908.]  New  York, 

Dodge  publishing  co.  „  ,^^,^,     ^^„       .,  .    *      ^ 

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modern) 

'*Cbief  dates  and  anthoritles** :  p.  8&-18&1 


L  Spencer,  Herbert,  1820-1908. 


Washington,  D.  C.    Pub. 
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I 


Columbm  tHnitJf  rsft'tp 

intl)fCtipof3lrttigdrk 

THE  LIBRARIES 


4> 


Philosophies  Ancient  and  Modern 


HERBERT    SPENCER 


£>■  .vw».il> 


I 


PHILOSOPHIES 

ANCIENT  AND  MODEEN 

Presenting  the  salient  features  of  the  Philosophies  of 

Greece  and  Rome  and  of  the  Middle  Ages, 

as  well  as  of  modern  Europe. 

Cloth,  50  cents  net. 

Early  Greek  PhUosophy.     By  A.  W.  Benn,  author  of  The  Philo- 
sophy oj  Greece,  Rationalism  in  the  Nineteenth  Centnry. 

Stoicism.      By    Professor    St.    George    Stock,    Lecturer    at 
Birmingham  University. 

Plato.    By  Professor  A.  E.  Taylor,  St.  Andrews  University, 
author  of  The  Problem  of  Conduct. 

Scholasticism.    By  Father  Rickaby,  S.J. 

Hobbes.    By  Professor  A.  E.  Taylor,  late  Professor  at  M'Gill 
College,  Montreal. 

Locke.    By  Professor  Alexander,  of  Owens  College,  Man- 
Chester. 

Comte   and   Mill.     By  T.    W.    Whittaker,  author  of  The 
Neoplatonists,  Apollonius  of  Tyana  and  other  Essays. 

Herbert  Spencer.    By  W.  H.   Hudson,  author  of  An  Intro- 
duction to  Spencer's  Philosophy. 

Schopenhauer.    By  T.  W.  Whittaker. 

Berkeley.    By  Professor  Campbell  Fraser,  D.  C.  L.  ,  LL.  D. 

Bergson.    By  Father  Tyrrell. 

Lucretius  and  the  Atomists.    By  Edward  Clodd,  author  of 
The  Story  of  the  Creation. 


HERBERT   SPENCER 


By 

WILLIAM   HENRY   HUDSON 


k  \v 


NEW   YORK 
DODGE   PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

214-220    EAST   23RD    STREET 


^ 

>* 


\ 


PREFACE 

The  aim  of  this  little  book  is  almost  entirely 
expository.  I  have  tried  in  it  to  give  a  simple 
outline  of  the  cardinal  ideas  and  more  im- 
portant bearings  of  the  Synthetic  Philosophy. 
The  accomplishment  of  this  task  within  the 
limits  allowed  me  has  made  more  than  sufficient 
demands  upon  my  pov/ers  of  presentment  and 
condensation.  Absence  of  recorded  disapproval 
must,  therefore,  not  be  regarded  as  necessarily 
implying  assent.  Where  I  have  departed  from 
interpretation  to  express  judgment,  I  have  done 
so  simply  for  the  purpose  of  indicating  certain 
points  at  which,  in  respect  ot  fundamental 
matters,  Spencer's  account  of  things  seems  to  me 
to  be  most  seriously  open  to  criticism. 

WILLIAM  HENEY  HUDSON. 


I 


CONTENTS 


n 


*^"^P-  PAGE 

I.  Herbert  Spencer  :  His  Life  and  Character,        1 


II.  *  First  Principles,'  . 

III.  *The  Principles  of  Biology,' 

IV.  *The  Principles  of  Psychology,' 
V.  'The  Principles  of  Sociology,' 

VI.  'The  Principles  of  Ethics,'   . 

VII.  On  the  Evolution  of  Religion, 
Chief  Dates  and  Authorities, 


16 
28 
39 
50 
64 
76 
88 


) 


HERBERT  SPENCER 


CHAPTER  I 


HIS  LIFE  AND  CHARACTER 


Herbert  Spencer  was  born  at  Derby  on  27th 
April  1820.  His  father,  a  teacher,  was  a  man  of 
pronounced  individuality,  independent  in  thought 
and  action,  rigidly  conscientious,  but  somewhat 
captious  and  austere.  His  mother  was  a  woman 
of  only  average  intelligence,  in  whom,  in  marked 
contrast  with  the  Spencer  stock,  *  altruism  was  too 
little  qualified  by  egoism.'  Spencer  believed  that 
such  of  his  '  specialities  of  character  and  faculty ' 
as  were  '  due  to  inheritance '  were  derived  from 
his  father.  Certainly  his  father's  influence  was 
the  most  important  factor  in  his  early  life.  It 
was  largely  owing  to  his  mother's  subordination  in 
the  household  that  the  home-atmosphere,  while 
unusually  clear  and  bracing,  was  rather  chilly 
A  I 


HERBERT  SPENCER 


and  dry.  The  conditions  of  his  childhood  tended 
to  foster  self-reliance,  originality,  critical  power. 
They  did  little  to  develop  the  emotional  side  of 
his  nature. 

The  elder  Spencer  was  strongly  opposed  to 
the  educational  methods  then  in  vogue,  and 
though  the  boy  was  sent  for  a  time  to  a  day- 
school,  he  knew  little  of  mental  pressure  or  the 
discipline  of  a  regular  routine.  Judged  by  ordi- 
nary standards,  his  early  progress  was  therefore 
extremely  unsatisfactory.  But,  meanwhile,  he 
gained  in  many  respects  from  the  '  miscellaneous 
intellectual  training '  which  he  received  at  home. 
He  was  *  a  frequent  listener '  to  discussions  among 
his  father's  friends  on  politics,  religion,  and 
ethics.  His  taste  for  science  and  natural  history 
was  encouraged.  His  father's  principle  being 
'  that  of  self-help  carried  out  in  all  directions,'  the 
boy  was  continually  challenged  to  explain  things 
by  the  question — '  Can  you  tell  me  the  cause  of 
this?'  This,  he  considered,  did  much  to  estab- 
lish in  him  '  a  habit  of  seeking  for  causes,  as  well 
as  a  tacit  belief  in  the  universality  of  causation.' 

At  the  age  of  thirteen,  he  was  placed  in  charge 
of  an  uncle,  the  Rev.  Thomas  Spencer,  perpetual 
curate  of  Hinton  Charterhouse,  near  Bath,  a 
radical  clergyman,  well  known  for  his  activity  in 


HIS  LIFE  AND  CHARACTER 

social    reform,    and    characterised,  like  all    the 
Spencers,  by  vigour  of  intellect  and  strongly- 
marked    individuality.      At    Hinton,  where    he 
remained  three  years,  his  education  was  taken 
more  systematically  in  hand,  though  unfortun- 
ately history  and  general  literature  had  no  place 
in  his  course.     In  some  ways  he  profited  little. 
Hating  the  study  of  languages,  mainly  because  it 
involves  the  rote-learning  of  words  and  arbitrary 
rules,  he  made  slight  progress  with  Greek,  Latin, 
and  French.    But,  on  the  other  hand,  physics  and 
mathematics  greatly  attracted  him,  and  helped 
the  development  of  his  reasoning  powers.    One 
incident  of  this  period  is  worth  recording  even  in 
the  briefest  sketch.    While  reading  with  his  uncle 
Dr.  Arnott's  treatise  on  Phj^sics,  he  boldly  dis- 
sented from  the  doctrine  of  inertia  as  there  set 
forth;  and  when  his  uncle  supported  Arnott's  view, 
he  remained  unshaken  in  his  opposition.     He 
notes  this  as  an  early  illustration  of  his  *  constitu- 
tional disregard  for  authority.*    It  reveals,  more- 
over, the  growth  of  various  other  salient  features 
of  his  mind  and  character,  especially  his  indepen- 
dence of  thought,  his  immense  self-confidence, 
and  his  indomitable  will.     '  Anything  like  passive 
receptivity,'  he  elsewhere  remarks,  was  always 
*  foreign  to  my  nature.'    Neither  then,  nor  at  any 

3 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

other  time,  did  he  pay  the  smallest  respect  to 
dogma  or  tradition.  A  chief  ground  of  his  quarrel 
with  ordinary  methods  of  education  was  that 
*  they  encourage  submissive  receptivity  instead  of 
independent  activity.' 

Thomas  Spencer  for  a  time  entertained  the 
hope  that  his  nephew  would  go  to  Cambridge. 
This  was,  however,  relinquished ;  and  on  leaving 
Hinton,  Herbert  returned  home.  After  a  short 
experiment  in  teaching,  for  which  (unlike  another 
great  educational  theorist,  Rousseau)  he  seems 
to  have  possessed  conspicuous  qualifications,  he 
turned  his  attention,  in  1837,  to  railway  engineer- 
ing as  a  profession  in  which  he  had  every  chance 
of  success.  Yet  when,  after  ten  years,  a  combina- 
tion of  reasons  led  him  to  abandon  it,  he  did  so 
apparently  without  much  regret.  At  twenty- 
eight,  he  had  to  start  life  afresh.  These  ten 
years  had,  however,  counted  greatly  in  his  in- 
tellectual development.  At  twenty,  while  engaged 
on  the  Birmingham  and  Gloucester  Railway,  he 
became  much  interested  in  geology.  As  a  result, 
he  bought  Lyell's  recently-published  Principles 
of  Geology.  One  chapter  in  that  work  'was 
devoted  to^a  refutation  of  Lamarck's  views  con- 
cerning the  origin  of  species.'  He  rose  from  its 
perusal  with  a  'decided  leaning'  towards  such 


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Jp 


i 


i 


HIS  LIFE  AND  CHARACTER 

views.     That  Lyell's  arguments  thus  produced 
'  the  "opposite  effect  to  that  intended '  was,  he 
afterwards  believed,  chiefly  due  to  the  harmony 
of  the  development  hypothesis  (as  the  evolution 
theory  was  then  called)  with  the  whole  move- 
ment of  his  mind  towards  a  purely  naturalistic 
interpretation  of  things.     Ridiculed  as  he  was  for 
entertaining  ideas  then  so  much  at  variance  with 
current  scientific  opinion,  his  belief  in  evolution 
never  afterwards  wavered.     Two  years  later  he 
opened  his  career  as  an  author  by  the  publication 
in  the  Nonconformist  of  a  series  of  twelve  letters, 
presently  revised  and  reissued  in  pamphlet  form, 
on  The  Proper  Sphere  of  Government.    This  little 
work  is  remarkable  for  the  clearness  with  which 
it  enunciates  that  uncompromising  individualism 
which  was  to  be  the  key-note  of  his  later  political 
writings.      The    influence    of   the    development 
hypothesis   upon   the  young   thinker's   mind   is 
shown  in  his  contention  that  the  phenomena  of 
social  life,  no  less  than  those  of  organic  nature, 
conform  to  law,  and  that  social  progress  depends 
upon  the  gradual  adaptation  of  constitution  to 
conditions.     The   practical   inference   drawn  is, 
that  such  progress  is  a  process  of  natural  self- 
adjustment,  which  is  not  helped  but  hindered  by 
State  interference,  and  that   the  true  and  only 

S 


y 


HEKBERT  SPENCER 

function  of  government  is  to  maintain  such 
*  equitable  relations  among  citizens '  as  will  allow 
this  process  to  go  on  unimpeded — *  in  a  word,  to 
administer  justice.' 

Engineering  having  failed  him,  Spencer  looked 
next  to  journalism,  and  there  he  was  fortunate 
enough  to  find,  almost  immediately,  an  open  door. 
In  December  1848  he  became  sub- editor  of  The 
Economist,  a  position  which  he  held  till  1853, 
and  then  resigned,  that  he  might  devote  himself 
entirely  to  independent  literary  work.  The  step 
was  prompted  by  the  feeling  that  he  had  now 
discovered  his  true  field.  In  1850  he  had  pub- 
lished his  first  important  book.  Social  Statics. 
In  this,  the  naturalistic  theories  of  society  and 
the  extreme  individualism  of  the  Letters  on 
Government  are  more  fully  developed,  and  the 
evolutionary  conception  of  progress  as  a  transi- 
tion from  the  uniform  to  the  multiform  is  clearly 
implied.  It  was  followed,  in  the  course  of  the 
next  few  years,  by  various  essays,  in  which  it  is 
now  both  easy  and  interesting  to  trace  the  move- 
ment of  his  thought  along  many  lines  towards 
the  doctrines  which  form  the  foundation  of  his 
philosophic  system;  and  by  a  large  volume  on 
the  Principles  of  Psychology  (1855),  in  which  the 
phenomena  of  mind  are  interpreted    from  the 


i 


i 


HIS  LIFE  AND  CHARACTER 

evolutionary  point  of  view.  A  further  stage  in 
the  expansion  and  consolidation  of  his  ideas  is 
marked  by  the  essay  on  Progress:  Its  Law  and 
Cause  (1857),  in  which  the  conception  of  evolu- 
tion as  universal  is  elaborated  and  illustrated  in 
detail.  The  next  year,  while  writing  a  long 
defence  of  the  nebular  hypothesis,  he  became 
possessed  of  the  idea  that  the  doctrine  of  evolu- 
tion might  be  made  the  basis  of  a  systematic 
interpretation  of  life,  mind,  and  society.  This 
was  the  origin  of  the  Synthetic  Philosophy.  The 
prospectus  of  the  proposed  series  of  volumes  was 
drawn  up  in  January  1858,  revised  in  1859,  and 
issued  in  March  1860. 

Spencer  thus  set  his  hand  to  a  task  which  he 
then  calculated  would  absorb  all  his  energies  for 
twenty  years.  Under  the  most  favourable  condi- 
tions the  undertaking  would  have  been  a  gigantic 
one.  Spencer's  circumstances  at  the  time  were  the 
reverse  of  favourable.  His  financial  outlook  was 
disquieting.  A  nervous  breakdown  which  had 
followed  the  strain  of  writing  the  Psychology  had 
left  him  a  martyr  to  sleeplessness  and  dyspepsia, 
and  with  sadly  curtailed  powers  of  work.  He 
himself  afterwards  realised  to  the  full  the  wildly 
extravagant  character  of  his  project,  which  '  to 
any  unconcerned    bystander'   might  well    have 

7 


HERBERT  SPENCER 


HIS  LIFE  AND  CHARACTER 


appeared  'almost  insane.'     'To  think   that   an 
amount  of  mental  exertion  great  enough  to  tax 
the  energies  of  one  in  full  health  and  vigour,  and 
at  ease   in  respect  of  means,  should  be  under- 
taken by  one  who,   having  only  precarious  re- 
sources, had  become  so  far  a  nervous  invalid  that 
he  could  not  with  any  certainty  count  upon  his 
powers  from  one  twenty-four  hours  to  another ! ' 
Yet  with  rare  and  admirable  courage  and  tenacity 
he  persevered  against  all  the  diflSculties  thrown  in 
his  way  by  financial  embarrassments,  the  meagre- 
ness  of  public   support,  adverse  criticism,    and 
ever-increasing  ill-health;  and  ultimately,  after, 
not  twenty,  but  thirty-six  years  of  toil,  he  was 
able  to  write  *  finis '  to  his  immense  life-work.    As 
a  monument  of  patient  labour,  self-sacrifice,  and 
superb  devotion  to  a  great  purpose,  the  Synthetic 
Philosophy  must  always  hold  a  high  place  in  the 
history  of  thought. 

Spencer  was  just  forty  when  he  began  First 
Principles.  From  this  point  on,  the  main  interest 
of  his  biography  must  be  sought  in  the  progress 
of  his  work.  For  some  twenty  years  the  stress 
of  labour  and  the  monotony  of  existence  were 
relieved  by  frequent  holidays,  undertaken  some- 
times for  simple  relaxation,  more  often  in  search 
of  health.     Of  these  the  most  important  were  a 

S 


V 


tour  in  Italy  in  1868,  an  excursion  up  the  Nile  in 
1879,  and  a  visit  to  America  in  1882.    But,  mean- 
while, the    troubles    arising   from   a  disordered 
nervous  system  had  been  steadily  growing  upon 
him ;  and  after  his  return  from  the  United  States, 
his  fast-waning  strength  compelled  him  more  and 
more  to  husband  his  powers  by  resolutely  shut- 
ting himself  off  from  all  outer  distractions.     This 
brought  about  his  gradual  withdrawal  from  the 
interests    of   the  social  world.      At  length    he 
became  almost  a  recluse,  hardly  accessible  to  his 
closest  friends,  and  to  others  not  accessible  at  all. 
He  had  never  married.     He  had  no  home  ties. 
To  avoid  the  evils  of  solitude,  he  lived  for  many 
years  in  boarding-houses  in  London.     This  sub- 
stitute for  domestic  life  presently  grew  intoler- 
able.   He  thereupon  tried  various  experiments  in 
making  a  home  of  his  own;  and  finally  took  a 
house  on  the  East  Cliff  at  Brighton.    There  he 
lapsed  rapidly  into   absolute   invalidism.      The 
completion  of  the  Synthetic  Philosophy  brought 
him  little  pleasure  beyond  what  was  afforded  by 
the  simple  sense  of  emancipation    from    long- 
continued  toil.     But  his  task  finished,  the  great 
purpose  of  his  life  achieved,   existence  was  left 
blank  of  interest  or  desire.    The  years  that  re- 
mained were  fraught  with  much  weariness  and 

9 


v/ 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

depression.  He  died  peacefully  in  the  early 
morning  of  Sth  December  1903.  His  body,  in 
accordance  with  his  directions,  was  cremated  at 
Golder's  Hill;  and  there  his  old  friend,  Mr. 
Leonard  (now  Lord)  Courtney,  delivered  an  im- 
pressive address. 

The  briefest  analysis  of  Spencer's  character 
shows  that  certain  closely  related  mental  and 
moral  qualities  stand  out  with  striking  distinct- 
ness. 

That  which  perhaps  first  arrests  attention  is 
Avhat  he  himself  calls  the  'ingrained  noncon- 
formity' of  his  nature.  The  'chronic  insubor- 
dination' of  his  boyhood  continued  throughout 
life.  Authority  had  no  meaning  for  him.  He 
was  wholly  uninfluenced  by  the  power  of  the 
past,  by  the  weight  of  creed  and  social  opinion, 
by  the  prestige  of  established  doctrines  and  great 
names.  To  quote  some  one  else's  views  in  support 
of  his  own  would  have  seemed  to  him  almost 
the  abnegation  of  his  right  to  think  for  himself. 
Always  an  impatient  reader,  he  went  to  books 
only  for  facts  not  otherwise  obtainable,  and  cared 
nothing  for  the  theories  and  conclusions  of  pre- 
ceding thinkers.  The  only  indebtedness  he 
recognised  to  them  was  'the  indebtedness  of 
antagonism.'     '  All  along,'  he  once  wrote  to  Leslie 

lO 


HIS  LIFE  AND  CHARACTER 


Stephen,  *I  have  looked  at  things  through  my 
own  eyes,  and  not  through  the  eyes  of  others.' 
Independent,  self-confident,  self-assertive,  he  was 
ready,  like  Athanasius,  to  stand  against  the 
world.  That  this  '  constitutional  disregard  for 
authority'  led  him  to  extremes,  he  afterwards 
admitted.  It  caused  him  at  times  to  'under- 
estimate the  past.'  It  only  too  evidently  bred 
such  a  habit  of  dissent  that,  as  the  Autobiography 
clearly  shows,  he  found  a  positive  pleasure  in 
cultivating  and  proclaiming  opposition  to  current 
ideas  on  anything  and  everything.  It  is  thus 
impossible  to  acquit  him  of  the  charge  of  an 
occasional  tendency  to  intellectual  arrogance. 
Yet  his  independence  and  fearlessness  have  of 
course  to  be  reckoned  among  the  characteristics 
which  enabled  him  to  accomplish  his  own  work 
as  a  pioneer  in  thought. 

Even  more  obviously  that  work  was  made 
possible  only  by  his  extraordinary  originality,  his 
penetration  and  grasp,  his  rare  capacity  for  both 
analysis  and  synthesis.  He  possessed  in  an 
astonishing  degree  the  power  of  *  constructive 
imagination.'  The  immense  fertility  of  his  mind 
is  illustrated  in  the  way  in  which  he  threw  out 
fresh  and  pregnant  ideas  on  every  subject  he 
touched.    Outside  the  field  of  philosophic  specu- 

II 


;f 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

lation  it  was  equally  shown  in  the  long  list  of 
his  inventions,  which  includes  all  sorts  of  in- 
genious devices  and  contrivances  from  a  scheme 
for  aerial  locomotion  on  the  one  hand  to  a  new 
fork  for  toasting  bacon  on  the  other. 

A  third  outstanding  characteristic  was  his  '  ab- 
normal   tendency   to    criticism/      Much    as    he 
regretted  this,  he  seems  never  to  have  made  any 
resolute  effort  to  check  it.    He  was,  in  fact,  some- 
what censorious ;  prone  to  fault-finding,  and  little 
given  to  praise.     This  '  incurable  habit '  led  to 
many  unfortunate  results.     In  ordinary  conversa- 
tion it  caused  him  continually  to  seek  reasons  for 
disagreement    and    disapproval.      It  made  him 
appear,  even  when  he  was  not  really,  unsym- 
pathetic.    It  gave  a  flavour  of  harshness  to  many 
of  his  judgments.     It  interfered  seriously,  as  he 
acknowledges,  with  his  appreciation  of  works  of 
literature  and  art,  and  to  some  extent  with  his 
enjoyment  of  music,  of  which  he  was  genuinely 
fond.    He  suspected  that  it  had  even  been  '  a  chief 
factor  in  the  continuance '  of  his  '  celibate  life.' 
He  makes  the  distressing  confession  that '  readi- 
ness to  see  inferiorities  rather  than  superiorities, 
must  have  impeded    the    finding  of   one    who 
attracted  me  in  adequate  degree '  for  marriage. 
The  more  important  defects  of  Spencer's  genius 

12 


«f 


.1 


HIS  LIFE  AND  CHARACTER 

and  character  were  the  defects  of  his  qualities. 
They  arose  almost  entirely  from  the  undue  pre- 
dominance of  his  intellectual  faculties  and  the 
subordination  of  the  emotional  nature.  In  him 
the  brain  was  always  in  the  ascendant,  while  the 
feelings  were  perpetually  restrained.  Hence  that 
lack  of  warmth  and  spontaneity  which  affected 
even  his  style;  hence  also  the  reserve  and 
austerity  of  manner  which  unfavourably  im- 
pressed those  who  came  casually  into  contact 
with  him.  It  is  to  be  deplored  that  the  whole 
course  of  his  life,  from  childhood  up,  should  have 
tended  towards  emotional  repression,  and  that,  in 
part  because  of  his  peculiar  temperament,  in  part 
on  account  of  the  sacrifices  entailed  by  his  work, 
he  should  have  shut  himself  off  so  completely 
from  common  human  relationships  and  responsi- 
bilities. His  real  genius  for  friendship  shows  that 
he  might  have  profited  greatly  by  larger  oppor- 
tunities for  the  culture  of  the  feelings.  As  it  was, 
his  emotional  deficiencies  adversely  influenced  in 
many  ways  his  whole  converse  with  life.  He  cared 
little  for  literature.  Poetry  made  but  slight  ap- 
peal to  him.  In  his  views  of  art  he  was  some- 
thing of  a  Philistine.  His  repeated  attacks  upon 
history  as  commonly  conceived  and  written, 
though  up    to  a  certain    point    fully  justified, 

13 


HERBERT  SPENCER 


exhibit  a  want  of  interest  in  personalities  which 
is  unmistakably  suggestive  of  his  limitations.  In 
opposing  the  unwisdom  of  much  that  is  miscalled 
philanthropy,  he  must,  even  to  those  who  most 
fully  agree  with  him,  often  seem  hard.  His  atti- 
tude towards  the  '  creed  of  Christendom,*  which 
he  curtly  dismissed  as  '  alien  to  my  nature,  both 
emotional  and  intellectual,'  proves  conclusively 
i  that  the  spiritual  claims  of  Christianity  were  never 
apprehended  by  him. 

In  private  life  other  defects  were  often  pain- 
fully apparent.  He  was  too  exacting  in  his 
demands  upon  others,  and  intolerant  of  their 
weaknesses  and  shortcomings.  He  was  frequently 
impatient,  irritable,  sharp  of  tongue.  But  these 
peculiarities  were  largely  due  to  ill-health— to 
sleeplessness,  dyspepsia,  and  the  morbid  mental 
condition  which  was  in  part  the  cause  and  in 
part  the  effect  of  persistent  hypochondria.  It 
would  be  improper,  therefore,  to  attach  too  much 
importance  to  them. 

All  deductions  made,  there  was  much  of  moral 
strength  and  greatness  in  Spencer's  character 
which  deserves  our  admiration.  He  was  a 
genuine  seeker  after  truth.  He  was  a  genuine 
apostle  of  righteousness.  Wholly  superior  to  all 
worldly  ambitions,  he  pursued  the  path  he  had 

14 


HIS  LIFE  AND  CHARACTER 

marked  out  for  himself  without  regard  for  per- 
sonal consequences.  Wealth  and  fame  had  no 
attractions  for  him.  Domineering  as  he  often 
was,  he  was  yet,  unlike  many  of  his  religious 
antagonists,  scrupulously  fair  in  controversy.  He 
showed  a  splendid  zeal  for  great  causes,  and  in 
upholding  what  he  believed  to  be  right,  he 
never  paused  to  consider  the  unpopularity  which 
might  result.  He  was  the  very  incarnation  of 
integrity.  Upright,  conscientious,  transparently 
honest  in  word  and  deed,  he  governed  his  life, 
even  in  its  minutest  details,  by  the  highest  prin- 
ciples of  rectitude  and  justice. 

Spencer's  work  is  very  voluminous ;  but  his 
miscellaneous  writings  may  be  regarded  as,  in  the 
main,  ancillary  to  the  System  of  Synthetic  Philo- 
sophy. This  comprises  ten  volumes — Fii^st  Prin- 
ciples, The  Principles  of  Biology,  The  Principles 
of  Psychology,  The  Principles  of  Sociology,  and 
The  Principles  of  Ethics.  Our  plan  here  will  be 
to  pass  the  contents  of  these  volumes  under  brief 
review,  reserving  a  few  pages  at  the  end  for  a 
consideration  of  Spencer's  interpretation  of 
religion. 


i; 


CHAPTER    II 


y 


'FIRST  principles' 

It  is  not  the  business  of  philosophy,  as  defined 
by  Spencer,  to  undertake  an  interpretation  of  the 
universe  different  in  kind  from  that  which  science 
gives.  Philosophy  builds  with  the  materials 
furnished  by  science.  Its  sphere  is,  therefore, 
that  of  phenomena.  It  makes  no  attempt  to 
transcend  these,  or  to  explore  the  problems  of 
Absolute  Being.  Insistence  on  this  limitation  is 
not  tantamount  to  a  denial  of  a  Reality,  of  which 
phenomena  are  merely  manifestations.  On  the 
contrary,  consciousness  of  such  Reality  is  involved 
in  all  our  thinking.  But  it  is  a  consciousness  of 
which  •  no  logical  account  can  be  given.'  Recog- 
nising the  Absolute  not  only  as  unknown  but 
also,  owing  to  the  constitution  of  our  intelligence, 
as  everlastingly  unknowable,  philosophy  proceeds 
to  its  own  task  of  reporting  upon  phenomena. 
Something  will  be  said  later  of  Spencer's  Doctrine 

i6 


'  FIRST  PRINCIPLES ' 

of  the  Unknowable  in  its  religious  aspects.  Here 
it  should  be  noted  that  he  elaborated  it  in  the 
forefront  of  his  positive  undertaking  for  the 
purpose  only  of  defining  the  scope  and  object  of 
his  philosophy.  It  was  no  part  of  his  plan  to 
employ  agnosticism  as  a  basis  for  his  interpreta- 
tion of  the  knowable.  That  interpretation  must 
therefore  be  regarded  as  independent  of  his 
metaphysical  prolegomena  and  judged  apart  from 
any  ontological  considerations. 

While,  however,  the  field  of  philosophy  is  con- 
terminate  with  that  of  science,  it  aims  within  that 
field  at  results  beyond  those  which  science  sets 
out  to  achieve.    Each  science  seeks  the  widest 
generalisations  possible  within  its  own  limits.    By 
such  generalisations  its  special  phenomena  are 
summed  up,  correlated,  unified.    But,  these  widest 
generalisations    reached,    the    bounds    of    each 
separate  science  are  reached  also.     Here  the  work 
of  philosophy  begins.     It  carries  the  process  of 
generalisation  and  unification  a  stage  further,     It 
seeks    such    most  general    statements    as    shall 
*  comprehend  and  consoHdate  the  widest  general- 
isations of  science.'    Its  purpose  is  to  find  those 
universal  truths  under  which  all  the   truths  of 
the  sciences  may  be  subsumed ;  to  formulate  the 
ultimate  laws  of  which  the  highest  laws  of  the 
B  '  ly 


// 


J 


/, 


HEKBEKT  SPENCER 

sciences  are  merely  corollaries./  Philosophy,  there- 
I   fore,  is  the  complete  unification  of  knowledge— 
y  '    knowledge  reduced  to  a  coherent  whole. 

However  rigorously  inductive  its  method,  such 
philosophy  must  assume  something  to  begin  with. 
Assumptions  made  provisionally  will  afterwards 
be  justified  if  the   conclusions  deducible    from 
them  are  shown   to  correspond  with  the  facts 
given  by  experience.    But  as  this  statement  itself 
postulates  the  existence  of  likenesses  and  differ- 
ences among  phenomena  and  the  competence  of 
consciousness  as  judge  of  these,  one  datum  is 
already  reached.     The  next  step  must  be  the  dis- 
covery of  some  ultimate  antithesis  to  which  all 
other  likenesses    and    differences   are    referable. 
This  is  found  in  our  '  deepest  cognition,'  the  dis- 
tinction between  self  and  not-self,  or  subject  and 
object.    But  this  is  not  all.     In  considering  the 
conditions  under  which  the  Unknowable  Power 
is  manifested,  we  are  brought  directly  to   the 
conceptions  of  space,  time,  matter,  and  motion. 
The  reality  of  these   *  most  general    forms'  of 
thought  is  taken  for  granted  alike  by  common 
sense  and  by  science.    But  these  '  necessary  data 
of   consciousness'   are    shown    by   psychological 
analysis    to    be    susceptible    of    decomposition. 
Space,  time,  matter,  motion,  are  all  translatable 

i8 


'  FIRST  PRINCIPLES ' 

into  terms  of  force,  which  itself  remains  untrans- 
latable into  any  other  terms.  To  force,  then, 
we  come  at  last  as  the  'ultimate  of  ultimates. 
But  since  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  force, 
throughout  all  its  transformations,  as  arising  out 
of  nothing  or  lapsing  into  nothing — since  con- 
stancy in  its  quantity  is  a  presupposition  and 
condition  of  all  science — it  follows  that '  the  force 
or  energy  manifested,  now  in  one  way  now  in 
another,  persists  or  remains  unchanged  in  amount.' 
In  the  Persistence  of  Force  (which  is  Spencer's 
phrase  for  Conservation  of  Energy),  we  therefore 
reach  the  ultimate  universal  truth  which  at  once 
forms  the  basis  of  all  science,  and,  as  underlying 
all  other  truths,  itself  transcends  demonstration. 
If  we  ask  what  this  force  is,  there  is  no  answer 
which  carries  us  beyond  the  phenomenal  effects 
wrought  by  it.  We  know  it  in  and  through  its 
manifestations.  Of  its  nature  we  know  nothing. 
*  By  the  Persistence  of  Force,  we  really  mean  the 
persistence  of  some  cause  which  transcends  our 
knowledge  and  conception.' 

That  completely  unified  account  of  things 
which  we  ask  from  philosophy  will  therefore  take 
the  shape  of  an  account  of  the  transformations 
of  force  under  the  modes  of  matter  and  motion. 
Such  an  account  becomes  possible  on  recognition 

19 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

of  certain  universal  truths  ^hich  are  deducible 
from  our  datum.    That  matter  is  indestructible 
and  motion  continuous,  is  clearly  implied  m  it. 
But  since  force  persists,  the  force  which  produces 
a  given  change  cannot  be  lost  in  producmg  that 
change;  it  must  simply  undergo  metamorphosis 
into  an  equivalent  amount  of  some  other  torce  or 
forces     Hence  the  connection  between  the  mani- 
festation of  force  which  we  call  cause  and  that 
which  we  call  effect  is  an  invariable  connection. 
'  Our  belief  in  the  necessity  and  universahty  of 
causation  is  the  belief  that  every  manifestation 
of  force  must  be  preceded  and  succeeded  by  some 
equivalent  manifestation.'    The  doctrines  of  the 
Transformation  and  Equivalence  of  Forces  and 
the  Uniformity  of   Law    are  thus    restated   as 
deductions  from  the  ultimate  datum  of  conscious- 
ness    Two  other  corollaries  have  to  be  added. 
Co-existent    forces    of   attraction  and  repulsion 
being  everywhere  at  work,  motion  follows  the  line 
of  least  resistance  or  of  greatest  traction  or  of  the 
resultant  of  the  two.    Where  there  is  a  conflict  of 
forces  not  in  equilibrium,  since  the  force  mani- 
fested in  motion  in  a  given  direction  cannot  be 
annihilated,  if  it  disappears  as  action  it  reappears 
as  reaction.    Hence,  within  limits,  the  direction 
of  motion  is  continually  being  reversed^    Tte  law 

20 


i 


f    1 


'FIRST  PRINCIPLES' 

of  the  Rhythm  of  Motion — universally  illustrated 
by  all  classes  of  phenomena — is  thus  affiliated 
upon  the  Persistence  of  Force.  Rhythm  is  not 
simply,  as  shown  by  the  facts,  a  characteristic  of 
all  motion.  It  is  a  necessary  characteristic  of  all 
motion. 

We  have  here,  then,  a  number  of  truths  having 
that  universality  which  philosophy  demands, 
since  they  are  truths  which,  holding  good  in  all 
the  special  sciences  and  thus  transcending  their 
class-limits,  may  be  used  to  *  unify  concrete  phen- 
omena belonging  to  all  divisions  of  Nature.'  But 
we  have  as  yet  advanced  no  further  than  the 
materials  for  our  philosophy.  We  have  learned 
what  are  the  factors  of  all  phenomena.  We  have 
now  to  investigate  the  co-operation  of  these 
factors  in  the  production  of  the  universe  and  all 
its  parts.  Each  science,  reaching  its  own  special 
synthesis  of  factors,  undertakes  to  show  how  its 
phenomena  in  all  their  complexity  arise  from  the 
combined  action  of  these  factors.  Philosophy 
must  seek  *  a  universal  synthesis '  in  which  all 
these  special  syntheses  may  be  gathered  up. 
What  is  required,  then,  is  the  formulation  of  a 
law  which  will  cover  the  entire  history  of  phen- 
omena as  known  to  us,  by  expressing  '  the  com- 
bined consequences'  of  the  forces  which  have 

21 


n 


HEKBERT  SPENCER 

been  separately  formulated.      The   universe,  in 
general  and  in  all  its  parts,  exhibits  itself  in  per- 
petual change.     Every  change  manifestly  involves 
change  in  matter  and  motion.    The  law  we  seek, 
therefore,  must  be  the  law  of  all  transformation 
given  in  terms  of  matter  and  motion.    With  this 
law  to  interpret  all  change,  philosophy  will  become 
synthetic ;  it  will  provide  a  systematised  genetic 
history  of  the  cosmos,  an  '  account  of  the  Trans- 
formation of  Things,'  and  'of  the  ultimate  uni- 
formities they  present,'  under  a  formula  which 
embraces  them  all.    This  law  of  the  perpetual 
redistribution  of  matter  and   motion  going  on 
throughout  the  universe  is  the  law  of  evolution 

and  dissolution. 

Necessarily,  that  it  may  cover  all  changes,  from 
those  of  the  sidereal  system  to  those  of  everyday 
social  life,  this  law  has  to  be  stated  in  the  most 
abstract  phraseology.    Spencer's  full  formula  of 
evolution  stands  thus :  '  Evolution  is  an  integra- 
tion of  matter  and   concomitant  dissipation  of 
motion  ;  during  which  the  matter  passes  from  an 
indefinite  incoherent  homogeneity  to  a  definite 
i  coherent  heterogeneity;    and  during  which  the 
retained  motion  undergoes  a  parallel  transforma- 
tion.'   While   the  more  abstruse   terms  of  this 
formula  cannot  now  be  discussed,  the  gist  of  it 

22 


If 


, 


'  FIRST  PRINCIPLES ' 

may  be  stated  in  somewhat  simpler  language. 
That  redistribution  of  matter  and  motion  which 
results  in  the  formation  of  an  aggregate  constitutes 
evolution.  Evolution,  therefore,  is  integration,  or 
an  increase  of  definiteness  and  coherence ;  as  the 
opposite  process,  dissolution,  is  disintegration,  or 
a  lapse  into  indefiniteness  and  incoherence.  But 
this  is  the  primary  aspect  only  of  the  evolutionary 
process.  It  is  commonly  accompanied  by  a 
parallel  movement  in  the  direction  of  increasing 
heterogeneity  or  diversity.  The  increasing  unity 
of  structure  which  characterises  an  evolving 
aggregate  is  that  unity  in  complexity  which  is 
gained  when  a  number  of  unlike  specialised  parts 
are  brought  into  organic  interdependence.  Evolub. 
tion  in_structure,  whether  it  be  in  the  growth  of 
a  seed  into  a  tree,  of  an  ovum  into  an  animal,  or 
of  a  primitive  into  an  advanced  society,  always 
means  a  change  from  uniformity  or  homogeneity 
to  multiplicity  or  heterogeneity.     The  unevolved. 


is  the  simple.  The  evolved  is  the  complex.  But 
such  increase  in  complexity  constitutes  evolution 
only  on  condition  that  the  primary  process  of 
integration  is  meanwhile  maintained.  Advance 
in  complexity,  if  not  accompanied  by  correspond- 
ing advance  in  organic  unity,  manrfestly  tends  to 
the  breaking  up  of  an  aggregate,  and  is  therefore 

23 


y 


/ 


I 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

in  the  line  not^of  evolutiQU  -hut  of  jissolution. 
'Jn^oIjilioSJ^^Se^-pailS-^^^ 

while  they  become  differentiated  from  one_a,UQtheF— 
ana~speciffise3jn_Jui^^ 
life^?  tKewhole. 

We  have  thus  a  formula  which,  in  the  most 
highly  generalised  statement,  covers  all  phases 
of  that  'continuous  transformation  which  the 
universe  undergoes.'  Or,  more  strictly  speaking, 
we  have  the  formula  of  all  changes  in  the  ascend- 
ing scale  of  life.  To  make  our  statement  com- 
plete, we  have  to  remember  that  the  ascending 
scale  implies  a  descending  scale.  Since  all 
motion  is  rhythmical,  the  forces  which  make  for 
integration  are  perpetually  in  conflict,  locally  and 
generally,  with  the  forces  which  make  for  dis- 
integration. Evolution  and  Dissolution  together 
constitute  the  entire  cycle  of  change.  Through 
this  cycle  all  things  pass.  To  what  we  meta- 
phorically call  the  '  law '  of  evolution  and  decay, 
all  things  conform.  The  same  law  of  trans- 
formation holds  good  throughout  the  cosmos. 
A  universal  principle  is  thus  given  in  terms  of 
which  a  systematised  account  of  things  may 
be  attempted. 

But  before  we  apply  our  formula  in  those 
various  departments  into  which  for  convenience 

24 


f 


'  FIRST  PRINCIPLES ' 

we  divide  a  universe  which  is  one  and  whole, 
another  step  has  to  be  taken.  The  formula  of 
evolution  is  only  empirical.  It  expresses  merely 
the  widest  generalisation  in  which  all  other 
generalisations  merge.  Philosophy  seeks  not  only 
a  systematic  account  of  the  transformations  of 
things,  but  also  the  rationale  of  such  tranforma- 
tions.  It  must  do  more  than  show  that  evolution 
is  universal.  It  must  provide  not  only  the  history 
of  the  facts,  but  also  their  causal  nexus.  It  must 
show  why  evolution  is  universal,  and  why  the 
changes  must  have  taken  place  in  the  way 
described,  and  could  have  taken  place  in  no  other 
way.  The  formula  of  evolution  must,  therefore, 
be  restated  deductively. 

This  is  done  by  reference  to  three  universal 
laws.  First,  the  condition  of  homogeneity  (or  of 
relative  homogeneity,  for  of  absolute  homogeneity 
we  know  nothing)  is  a  condition  of  instabihty ; 
as  the  different  parts  of  any  finite  mass  are  un- 
equally exposed  to  incident  forces,  differentiation 
must  result ;  the  relatively  homogeneous  becomes 
heterogeneous ;  the  heterogeneous  continually 
becomes  more  and  more  heterogeneous.  Secondly, 
every  cause  necessarily  produces  more  than  one 
effect.  Thirdly,  unlike  units  in  any  aggregate 
tend  to  separate  while  like  units  tend  to  cluster 

25 


■f 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

together,  and  thus  differentiations  are  made 
sharper  and  more  definite.  These  three  laws — the 
Instability  of  the  Homogeneous,  the  Multiplication 
of  Effects,  and  Segregation — together  explain  the 
necessity  of  those  evolutionary  processes  described 
in  the  formula.  These  three  laws  being  exhibited 
as  deductions  from  the  Persistence  of  Force,  the 
formula  of  evolution  is  presented  under  a  rational 
character. 
Y^  The  foundations  of  philosophy  as  completely 
unified  knowledge  are  thus  laid.  To  the  estab- 
Hshment  of  these  universal  truths  Spencer's  intro- 
ductory volume,  First  Principles,  is  devoted.  In 
the  nine  volumes  which  follow,  these  universal 
truths  are.  carried  forward  as  an  organon  into  the 
special  phenomena  which  form  the  subject-matter 
of  biology,  psychology,  sociology,  and  ethics. 

>  A  word  of  warning  is  here  desirable.  For  the 
purposes  of  his  philosophy  Spencer  kept  close  to 
a  mechanical  phraseology.     He  sought  to  give  a 

.  genetic  history  of  the  universe  in  terms  of  matter, 
motion,  and  force.  This  might  seem  to  imply 
that  his  system  is  patently  materialistic.  To 
regard  it  as  such,  would,  however,  be  to  take  it  in 
a  sense  which  he  himself  repudiated.  When  we 
speak  of  matter,  motion,  and  force,  we  are  only 
endeavouring  to  reduce  our  complex  symbols  of 

26 


I 


/fl- 


*  FIRST  PRINCIPLES* 

thought  to  the  simplest  symbols.  But  we  are 
still  dealing  with  symbols.  'The  problem  of 
existence  is  not  solved ;  it  is  simply  moved  further 
back.'  Matter,  motion,  force,  are  themselves  in- 
volved in  the  ultimate  mystery  of  things.  They 
are  concepts  with  which  we  have  to  work.  But 
they  are  only  signs  of  the  Unknowable  Reality 
underlying  them  all.  xf 


27 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  BIOLOGY' 


Al 


CHAPTER   III 

*THE   PRINCIPLES  OF  BIOLOGY* 

Unbroken  continuity  in  the  great  chain  of  things 
is  of  course  a  postulate  of  the  evolutionary  philo- 
sophy. '  Evolution  being  a  universal  process,  one 
and  continuous  throughout  all  forms  of  existence, 
there  can  be  no  break,  no  change  from  one  group 
of  concrete  phenomena  to  another,  without  a 
bridge  of  intermediate  phenomena.'  The  com- 
plete unification  of  knowledge  demands  that  we 
should  do  more  than  show  that  one  law  of  evolu- 
tion explains  the  development  of  the  solar  system, 
of  our  own  planet,  of  life  at  large,  of  mind,  of 
society.  It  demands  that  we  should  trace  the 
sequence  of  development  not  only  throughout 
each  division  of  our  inquiry,  but  also  from  each 
division  to  the  next.  Our  proper  course  would, 
therefore,  be  to  outline  the  evolutionary  process 
in  the  inorganic  world,  and  then  pass  on  to  the 
organic  across  a  bridge  which  should  connect  the 
two.    Owing  to  the  vast  compass  of  his  scheme, 

28 


however,  Spencer  was  compelled  to  omit  alto- 
gether the  discussion  of  the  phenomena  of 
inorganic  evolution,  and  with  it,  the  projected 
consideration  of  '  the  evolution  of  organic  matter,' 
as  '  the  step  preceding  the  evolution  of  living 
forms.'  The  result  is  that  we  reach  the  pheno- 
mena of  life  not  by  a  bridge,  but  by  a  leap. 
The  required  continuity  fails  at  the  outset. 

Of  the  origin  of  life,  Spencer  speaks  only  tenta- 
tively. Rejecting  the  theory  of  the  spontaneous 
generation  of  organic  forms,  he  assumes  the  rise 
of  organic  matter  out  of  inorganic  under  condi- 
tions no  longer  existing,  and  thence  of  'the  earliest 
living  things — probably  minute  units  of  proto- 
plasm smaller  than  any  the  microscope  reveals  to 
us.'  Organic  matter  provides  the  physical  basis 
of  life.  Yet  '  even  to  imagine  those  processes 
going  on  in  organic  matter  out  of  which  emerges 
the  dynamic  element  of  Life,'  is,  Spencer  admits, 
*  impossible.' 

With  the  phenomena  of  life  in  their  simplest 
cognisable  forms,  we  have,  however,  a  fresh  start- 
ing-point for  systematic  investigation.  Every 
organism  presents  certain  vital  phenomena  in  its 
development  and  decay.  The  organic  world  as 
a  whole  presents  an  ensemble  of  such  phenomena. 
In  the  interpretation  of  these  we  have  to  choose 

29 


asii^ 


■•—■-■•-' 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

between  two  possible  hypotheses.  'Either  the 
multitudinous  kinds  of  organisms  which  now 
exist,  and  the  far  more  multitudinous  kinds  which 
have  existed  during  past  geologic  ages,  have 
been  from  time  to  time  separately  made ;  or  they 
have  arisen  through  actions  such  as  we  see  habit- 
ually going  on.'  Spencer  subjects  the  former 
hypothesis,  that  of  Special  Creation,  to  searching 
examination,  and  finds  it  untenable.  The  pheno- 
mena of  life  will  thus  have  to  be  interpreted 
according  to  the  alternative  hypothesis  as  pheno- 
mena of  evolution.  The  implication  is  not, 
however,  that  which  is  commonly  supposed. 
In  ordinary  language,  the  evolution- theory  is 
described  as  the  naturalistic  theory  of  the  origin 
of  things,  as  contrasted  with  the  Special  Creation 
theory,  which  is  spoken  of  as  supernaturalistic. 
But  the  evolution  theory  no  less  than  the  Special 
Creation  theory  demands  a  Cause,  and  finds  that 
Cause  inscrutable.  The  question  merely  is,  *  How 
this  inscrutable  Cause  has  worked  in  the  produc- 
tion of  living  forms.'  Evolution  interprets  all  the 
phenomena  of  life  at  large,  in  all  their  range  and 
variety,  as  arising  gradually,  through  the  play  of 
natural  forces  and  in  obedience  to  what,  symboli- 
cally, we  call  natural  laws. 

Spencer,  therefore,  undertakes  to  exhibit  the 

30 


'  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  BIOLOGY ' 

great  general  facts  of  organic  life  as  illustrations 
of  the  law  of  evolution.    The  phenomena  of  life, 
whether  we  regard  life  in  its  totality  or  confine 
ourselves  to  any  one  of  its  phases,  everywhere 
present  those  parallel  movements    towards  in- 
creasing complexity  and  increasing  unity  which 
are  formulated  in  that  law.  The  lowest  organisms 
are  the  simplest,  and  in  them  there  is  least  inter- 
dependence among  the  parts  which  exist.    Higher 
organisms  show  a  greater  degree  of  multiformity 
and  a  correspondingly  greater  degree  of  integra- 
tion.   In    the    highest  organisms    the   greatest 
degree  of  complexity  in  unity  has  been  reached. 
In  the  star-fish,  for  instance,  we  have  a  repetition 
of  similar  parts  performing  similar  functions  and 
having  little  vital  interdependence.    In  man,  we 
have  many  unlike  parts,  specialised  to  perform 
different  functions,  and  thus,  by  a  '  physiological 
division  of  labour,'  carrying  on  the  far  ampler  life 
of  the  organism  as  a  whole.    These  '  leading  facts 
of  organic  evolution '  may  further  be  presented  in 
deductive  form.    Organic  matter  is  characterised 
by  extreme  instability,  and  must,  therefore, '  be  a 
substance  which  is  beyond  all  others  changeable 
by  the  forces  acting  on  it  from  without.'   Changes 
which  originate  in  differentiations  thus  brought 
about  will  go  on  cumulatively  through  the  pro- 

31 


l\ 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

cesses  described  as  the  Multiplication  of  Efiects 
and  Segregation. 

Here  the  question  arises,  What  is  Life?  In 
the  most  generalised  statement,  Life  may  be  de- 
fined as  *  the  continuous  adjustment  of  internal 
relations  to  external  relations.'  'All  vital 
actions,  considered  not  separately  but  in  their 
ensemble,  have  for  their  final  purpose  the  bal- 
ancing of  certain  outer  processes  by  certain  inner 
processes.  There  are  external  forces  having  a 
tendency  to  bring  the  matter  of  which  living 
bodies  consist,  into  that  stable  equilibrium  shown 
by  inorganic  bodies ;  there  are  internal  forces  by 
which  this  tendency  is  constantly  antagonised.' 
Life  is  perfect  only  when  the  correspondence 
between  outer  and  inner  is  perfect.  Life  con- 
tinues only  so  long  as  a  sufficient  correspondence 
continues.  When  the  correspondence  fails,  life 
ends.  Life,  therefore,  is  a  moving  equilibrium,  a 
balance  between  the  forces  of  an  organism  and 
the  forces  of  the  environment.  This  definition,  it 
must  be  understood,  refers  to  phenomenal  life  only. 
Beneath  the  phenomenal  manifestations  there  is 
a  *  dynamic  element  in  life  '  which  is  indeed  *  its 
essential  element.'  But  this  dynamic  and  essen- 
tial quality — 'the  noumenal  reality  which  is 
revealed  in  the  manifestations ' — is  unknown  and 

32 


'  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  BIOLOGY ' 

unknowable.  '  Life  in  its  essence,'  Spencer  goes 
so  far  as  to  confess,  dismissing  in  one  phrase  all 
materialistic  theories  of  it, '  cannot  be  conceived 
in  physico-chemical  terms.'  It  is  thus  with 
phenomenal  life  only  that  we  have  to  deal.  But 
so  far  as  life  comes  within  the  field  of  scientific 
investigation,  the  definition  is  sufficient. 

It  follows  that  the  degree  of  life  varies  with 
the  degree  of  correspondence.  Life  may  be  tested 
by  its  amount— that  is,  by  the  number,  com- 
plexity, and  length  of  the  correspondences  shown 
between  inner  and  outer.  In  a  low  organism,  even 
if  the  series  of  correspondences  be  long  main- 
tained, and  life  be  thus  preserved  for  a  considerable 
time,  the  correspondences  themselves  are  rela- 
tively few  and  simple.  In  higher  organisms  the 
correspondences  become  more  and  more  numer- 
ous and  complex.  'The  highest  life'  is  'that 
which,  like  our  own,  shows  great  complexity  in  the 
correspondences,  great  rapidity  in  the  succession 
of  them,  and  great  length  in  the  series  of  them.' 

Fresh  light  is  thus  thrown  on  the  evolution  of 
life.  Increase  in  heterogeneity  throughout  the 
universe  at  large  means  increase  in  the  hetero- 
geneity of  the  environments  of  many  organisms. 
When  the  environment  becomes  more  complex 
the  internal  forces  of  the  organism  must  become 

C  33 


il 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

more  complex  in  order  that  the  moving  equili- 
brium may  be  maintained.  Simple  conditions  in 
surroundings  are  easily  balanced  by  simple  re- 
sponse on  the  part  of  the  organism.  But  change 
in  the  direction  of  greater  intricacy  on  the  one 
side  must  be  met  by  change  in  the  direction  of 
increasing  intricacy  on  the  other,  or  the  balance 
will  be  brought  to  an  end.  This  fact  may  also  be 
regarded  from  the  opposite  point  of  view.  Every 
increase  in  the  heterogeneity  of  an  organism,  how- 
ever caused,  makes  for  increase  in  the  hetero- 
geneity of  the  surroundings.  With  every  advance 
in  life  the  environment  becomes  larger  and  more 
comprehensive.  The  general  truth  is  thus  dis- 
closed that  '  the  superior  organisms  inhabit  the 
more  complicated  environments.* 

We  are  thus  introduced  to  the  phenomena  of 
adaptation.  While  organic  types  are  marked  by 
comparative  stability,  because  they  are  the  pro- 
ducts of  *  the  almost  infinite  series  of  actions  and 
reactions  to  which  ancestral  organisms  have  been 
exposed,'  yet  in  the  absence  of  a  capacity  for 
modification  suflScient  to  assure  adjustment  to 
changing  conditions  no  evolution  of  life  would  be 
possible.  Here  the  principle  of  heredity  comes 
into  play ;  changes  set  up  in  an  organism  tending 
to  reproduce  themselves  in  succeeding  genera- 

34 


*  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  BIOLOGY ' 

tions  along  with  the  more  permanent  character- 
istics of  the  organism  in  which  they  have  arisen. 
In  life  at  large,  adaptation  is  brought  about  by 
both  Direct  and  Indirect  Equilibration.  The  action 
of  the  environment  produces  change,  as  in  the 
skin  of  a  labourer's  hand.  Functional  change, 
within  limits,  produces  structural  change,  for 
parts  increase  by  use,  as  in  the  muscles  of  a 
blacksmith's  arm,  and  diminish  through  disuse. 
Such  '  acquired  characters '  being  transmitted  to 
offspring,  tend,  where  conditions  favour,  to  become 
permanent  elements  in  the  equilibration  of  a  race. 
But  with  this  principle  only  to  guide  us  the 
larger  part  of  the  phenomena  of  evolving  life 
must  remain  unexplained.  Meanwhile,  a  fact  of 
the  profoundest  importance  comes  into  view. 
This  is  the  fact  of  variation.  No  two  individuals 
of  a  species  are  ever  quite  alike.  However  the  varia- 
tions may  originate — which  is  a  separate  question 
— one  result  is  clear.  Such  variations  as  assist  an 
organism  or  a  race  in  maintaining  or  perfecting 
equilibrium  will  give  it  an  advantage  in  life  as 
against  other  organisms  or  races  in  which  they 
do  not  occur  or  in  which  other  variations  occur 
tending  to  destroy  or  impair  equilibrium.  *  Those 
individuals  whose  functions  are  most  out  of 
equilibrium  with  the  modified  aggregate  of  ex- 

35 


■A^ 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

temal  forces,  will  be  those  to  die ;  and  those  will 
survive  whose  functions  happen  to  be  most  nearly 
in  equilibrium  with  the  modified  aggregate  of  ex- 
ternal forces.  But  this  survival  of  the  fittest  im- 
plies the  multiplication  of  the  fittest And  by 

the  continual  destruction  of  the  individuals  least 
capable  of  maintaining  their  equilibria  .  .  .  there 
must  eventually  be  reached  an  altered  type  com- 
pletely  in  equilibrium  with  the  altered  conditions.' 
Concerning  these  generalisations  two  remarks 
have  to  be  made.     Spencer's  doctrine  of  Indirect 
Equilibration,  or  the  Survival  of  the  Fittest,  is,  it 
will  be  seen,  a  restatement  of  Darwin's  doctrine 
of  Natural  Selection.     As  early  asJ852,  ip  his 
essay, '  A  Theory  of  Population,'  Spencer  had  him- 
seH  come  within  measurable  distance  of  Darwin's 
great  contribution  to  biology.    But  the  full  signi- 
ficance of  the  idea  then  expressed— that '  among 
human  beings  the  survival  of  those  who  are  the 
select  of  their  generation  is  a  cause  of  develop- 
ment'—was  unperceived  by  him  until  he  read 
The  Origin  of  Species.     Natural  Selection  was 
then  absorbed  into  his  system  as  a  part  of  the 
universal  process  towards  equilibrium. 

In  the  second  place  it  should  be  noted  that  in 
relying  upon  the  theory  of  the  transmission  of 
^  acquired  characters,'  Spencer  committed  himself 
\  36 


\ 


\ 


^ 


! 


'  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  BIOLOGY ' 

to  a  position  which,  though  commonly  accepted 
at  the  time,  has  since  been  vigorously  challenged 
by  many  practical  scientists.  Whether  such 
alleged  transmission  is  a  fact  remains  a  question 
dividing  biologists,  and  upon  which  it  would  be 
impertinent  for  one  who  is  not  a  biologist  to 
hazard  an  opinion.  Spencer  to  the  end  fought 
hard  for  his  view;  and  it  was  natural  that  he 
should  have  done  so,  since  the  inheritance  of 
functionally-produced  characters  is,  as  we  shall 
see,  a  vital  principle  in  his  philosophy. 

Considered  in  its  widest  bearings,  the  law  of 
equilibration  will  be  found  to  lead  to  conclusions 
of  the  utmost  importance.  That  any  race  may 
continue  to  exist,  it  is  necessary  that  its  preserva- 
tive forces  shall  successfully  balance  the  forces 
which  tend  to  destroy  it.  Now  the  race-preserva- 
tive forces  are  two:  the  power  of  each  unit  to 
preserve  itself,  which  we  may  call  individuation ; 
and  its  power  to  propagate  other  members  of  the 
race,  which  we  may  call  genesis.  Spencer  dis- 
covered that  there  is  a  'necessary  antagonism' 
between  these  two  powers — that  one  acts  at  the 
expense  of  the  other.  His  law  is  that  they  vary 
inversely.  When  the  organism  is  low,  there  will 
be  little  individual  ability  to  contend  with  ex- 
ternal dangers ;  and  for  this  inability  compensa- 

37 


^gsm^m 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

tion  must  be  provided  by  great  fertility,  or  the 
race  will  die  out.    In  this  case  a  high  death-rate 
will  be  offset  by  a  high  birth-rate.    Where  a  high 
degree  of  organisation  brings  much  capacity  for 
self-preservation,  a  correspondingly  low  degree  of 
fertiUty  will  suffice  to  maintain  the  race.     In  this 
case  a  low  birth-rate  will  be  enough  to  balance 
the  low  death-rate.     He  shows  deductively  that 
'  ability  to  multiply '  must  decrease  '  as  ability  to 
maintain  individual  life  increases ' ;  the  force  ex- 
pended on  individuation  being  taken  from  repro- 
duction.    Thus  we  reach   the  law  of  declining 
fertility— that  the  higher  the  organism,  the  lower 
the  race-increase.    By  this  law,  as  applied  to  the 
multiplication  of  the  human  race,  Spencer  over- 
threw the  Malthusian  doctrine  that  population 
everlastingly  tends  to  outrun  its  means  of  sup- 
port, and   that  the  evils  of   over-population  are 
inherent   in  the  very  conditions  of   life.      The 
movement  of  the  human  race  towards  more  and 
more  complete  equilibrium  with  its  surroundings, 
physical  and  social,  thus  reveals  itself  as  a  move- 
ment towards  an  ideal  condition  in  which,  death- 
rate  and  rate  of  reproduction  being  both  reduced 
to  a  minimum,  the  largest  possible  amount  of  life 
may  be  achieved  with  the  least  possible  expense 
to  the  individual. 

38 


CHAPTER  lY 

*THE  PRINCIPLES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY* 

Failure  to  establish  that  inter-connection  among 
all  classes  of  phenomena,  which  is  a  condition  of 
the  complete  unification  of  knowledge,  is  again 
encountered    when    we    turn    from    biology    to 
psychology.    If  we  pass  from  the  phenomena  of 
the  inorganic  to  those  of  the  organic  world  not 
by  a  bridge  but  by  a  leap,  it  is  by  another  leap 
that  we  have  to  pass  from  the  phenomena  of  life 
in    general    to    those    of    consciousness.      The 
thorough-going  evolutionist   having  already  as- 
sumed the  potentiaUty  of  life  in  matter  is  equally 
compelled  to  assume  the  potentiality  of  mind  in 
life.     However  resolutely  we  may  seek  to  affiliate 
psychology  upon  biology,  we  must,  therefore,  start 
on  our  psychological  investigations  from  a  fresh 
point  of  departure.    Whether  even  then  we  can 
hope  to  pursue  our  inquiry  without  check  or 
break— whether,  for  instance,  we  can  satisfactorily 
explain  the  higher  faculties  of  man  as  results  of 
antecedents  in  lower  forms  of  intelligence— is  a 

39 


t 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

question  which  sooner  or  later  must  be  raised, 
but  cannot  now  be  discussed.  To  prove  such 
unbroken  sequence  was  of  course  an  essential  part 
of  Spencer's  plan.  '  From  the  simple  reflex  action 
by  which  the  infant  sucks,  up  to  the  elaborate 
reasoning  of  the  adult  man,  the  progress  is  by 
daily  infinitesimal  steps.'  By  such  infinitesimal 
steps,  from  '  the  automatic  actions  of  the  lowest 
creatures '  to  '  the  highest  conscious  actions  of  the 
human  race,'  we  must  trace  the  development  of 
psychological  phenomena  in  Ufe  at  large. 

The  conception  of  psychology  as  only  a  special 
part  of  a  general  science  of  Hfe  based  upon  the 
principles  of  evolution,  thus  involves  a  total 
change  in  point  of  view  and  method.  The  adult 
human  intelligence  can  no  longer  be  treated  as 
isolated  and  unique.  To  understand  mind,  we 
must  learn  how  mind  has  evolved.  The  highest 
and  most  complex  manifestations  of  consciousness 
must  be  explained  by  reference  to  the  lower  and 
more  simple,  and  these,  again,  by  reference  to  the 
still  lower  and  more  simple,  until  we  have  suc- 
ceeded in  tracking  psychological  phenomena  back 
to  the  point  where  they  are  undistinguishable 
from  the  merely  physical. 

Now  consciousness  as  we  know  it  depends 
upon  and  is  correlated  with  the  nervous  system. 

40 


'  THE  PRINCIPLES.  OF  PSYCHOLOGY ' 

Spencer    therefore    opens    his    inquiry    on    the 
physiological  side.      He  subjects  the  structure 
and  functions  of  the  nervous  system  to  exhaustive 
analysis,  and  shows  that  its  evolution  conforms  to 
the  general  law  of  evolution,  since,  while  in  its 
most  rudimentary  forms  it  consists  of  'a  few 
threads  and  minute  centres '  and  is  '  very  much 
scattered,'  it  exhibits  in  development  increase  in 
relative  size,  and  in  the  complexity,  variety,  and 
concentration  of  its  connections.    This  done  we 
have  to  turn  to  a  class  of  facts  '  absolutely  with- 
out any  perceptible  or  conceivable  community  of 
nature '  with  these  physical  facts.     The  subjective 
aspects  of  those  phenomena  which,  objectively 
viewed,  are  '  as  purely  physical  as  the  absorption 
of  nutriment  or  the  circulation  of  the  blood,'  have 
now  to  be  considered.    '  The  changes  which,  re- 
garded   as  modes  of   the   Non-ego^  have    been 
expressed  in  terms  of  motion,  have  now,  regarded 
as  modes  of  the  Ego,  to  be  expressed  in  terms  of 

feeling.' 

Physical  science  deals  with  the  connection  among 
phenomena  in  the  outer  world ;  biology  with  the 
connection  among  phenomena  in  the  organism. 
The  business  of  psychology  is  with  the  connection 
between  these  connections.  Whatever  relations 
appear  in  consciousness  connote  relations  outside ; 

41 


I 

( 


1 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

and  psychology  is  concerned  with  the  relations 
between  the  two  sets  of  relations.     Psychological 
phenomena  thus  emerge  as  a  result  of  that '  con- 
tinuous adjustment  of  internal  relations  to  ex- 
ternal relations '  in  which,  according  to  previous 
definition,  life  at  large  has  been  found  to  consist. 
The  evolution  of  life,  biologically  considered,  is 
due  to  the  increasing  complexity  of  these  rela- 
tions.    But  it  is  up  to  a  certain  stage  only  that 
the  required  adjustment  can  be  maintained  in  an 
automatic  way.     A  point  is  presently  reached  at 
which  the  complexity  becomes  so  great  that  auto- 
matic adjustment  is  insufficient.    Here  conscious- 
ness   begins    to    appear.      The    phenomena    of 
intelligence  therefore  present  only  another  aspect 
of    the    general    phenomena    of    life,    in    that, 
'regarded  under  every  variety  of  aspect,  intelli- 
gence is  found  to  consist  in  the  establishment  of 
correspondences  between  relations  in  the  organism 
and  relations  in  the  environment.'     As  the  outer 
relations  continue  to  increase  in  number,  com- 
plexity, and  heterogeneity,  so  the  inner  relations 
must  continue  to  increase  in  number,  complexity, 
and  heterogeneity  to  keep  pace  with  them ;  and 
psychical  evolution  is  the  result. 

The  various  degrees  and  modes  of  intelligence 
commonly  known    as   instinct,  memory,  reason, 

42 


1 


'  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY ' 

emotion,  the  will,  must  therefore  be  exhibited  as 
stages  in  the  evolution  of  intelligence  as  thus 
conceived.  They  must  be  explained  '  in  terms  of 
the  relation  which  obtains  between  inner  and 
outer  phenomena.' 

Certain  fundamental  truths  must  be  recognised 
at  the  outset.     The  evolution  of  mind,  no  less 
than  the  evolution  of  body,  is  brought  about  by 
the  converse  of  the  organism  with  its  environ- 
ment.     Now  the  persistence  of  the  connection 
between  states  of  consciousness  must  be  propor- 
tionate   to   the    persistence    of    the    connection 
between   the  external    agencies   to  which   they 
answer.    Mental  states  tend  to  cohere  according 
to  the  degree  of  constancy  characterising  the  con- 
nections among  the  phenomena  to  which  they 
refer.    It  is  on  this  principle  that  we  explain  the 
fact  that '  when  any  two  psychical  states  occur  in 
immediate  succession,  an  effect  is  produced,  such 
as  that  if  the  first  subsequently  recurs,  there  is  a 
certain  tendency  for   the   second    to    follow  it.' 
This,  it  will  be  seen,  is  only  a  fresh  statement  of 
the  familiar  law  of  the  Association  of  Ideas.    But 
besides  being  thus  grounded  upon  the  general 
conception  of  the  relations  of  consciousness  and 
environment,  this  law  undergoes  great  amplifica- 
tion when  affiliated  upon  the  doctrine  of  evolu- 

43 


I' 

£ 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

tion.  We  have  now  something  more  than  a 
theory  of  the  association  of  ideas  in  the  in- 
dividual. The  results  of  repeated  experiences  of 
the  connections  among  external  phenomena, 
being  transmitted  as  modifications  of  nervous 
structure  from  generation  to  generation,  become 
organised  in  the  race.  The  implications  of  this 
principle  we  shall  note  directly.  We  have  first  to 
outline  the  broad  stages  of  psychical  evolution. 

When  in  the  lowest  living  creature  a  single 
stimulus  from  the  environment  is  followed  by  a 
single  responsive  motion,  we  have  what  is  called 
reflex  action.  This  is  the  '  rudimentary  psychical 
act,  not  yet  differentiated  from  a  physical  act.' 
This  'nervous  shock'  must  be  regarded  as  the 
primordial  unit  of  consciousness.  Instinct  is 
reflex  action  in  a  higher  phase  of  development. 
It  arises  when,  with  increase  in  the  complication 
of  the  relations  between  organism  and  surround- 
ings, 'a  combined  cluster  of  stimuli  produce 
automatically  a  combined  cluster  of  motions.' 
We  have  seen  that  the  more  frequently  psychical 
states  occur  in  a  certain  order,  the  stronger 
becomes  their  tendency  to  cohere  in  that  order. 
This  tendency  being  inherited,  there  will  ulti- 
mately result  in  any  given  race  of  creatures  an 
automatic  connection  of  nervous  actions  corre- 

44 


'  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY ' 

spending  to  the   external  relations   perpetually 
experienced,  and  thus  an  average  balance  between 
the  activities  of  the  individual  creature  and  the 
demands  of  that  environment,  under  the  influ- 
ence of  which  the  race  to  which  it  belongs  has 
been  moulded.     But  the  correspondence  of  inner 
and  outer,  which  is  thus  regular  enough  in  the 
simpler  forms  of  life,  becomes  irregular  with  the 
increase  of  complexity  on  the  one  side  and  the 
other.     With  advancing  heterogeneity  and  de- 
creasing frequency  of  occurrence  in  the  groups  of 
external  relations  to  which  inner  adjustments  have 
to  be  made,  the  response  of  organism  to  environ- 
ment ceases  to  be  automatically  fixed  and  certain. 
Adjustments  are  therefore  made  slowly  and  with 
hesitation,  and  in  this  way  conscious  perception, 
memory,  and  reason  begin  to  arise.   That  conscious 
perception,  memory,  and  reason  grow  out  of  in- 
stinct is  shown  by  the  familiar  converse  fact  that 
actions  which  at  first  are  performed  deliberately 
and  by  their  aid  become  automatic  or  instinctive 
through  frequent  repetition;    conscious  adjust- 
ments which  originate  when  the  co-ordination 
between  inner  and  outer  is  broken  pass  back  into 
unconscious  adjustments  when  it  is  re-established. 
The  genesis  of  the  feelings  is  similarly  explained 
on  the  principle  that  when  psychical  changes 

45 


'4. 


HERBERT  SPENCER 


I" 


1' 


become  too  complicated  to  be  simply  automatic, 
they  become  incipiently  sensational.     Once  more, 
the  development  of   the  will    is   only  another 
aspect  of  the  same  general  process  of  evolution. 
When   through  increasing  complexity  and  im- 
perfect   coherence  of  relations    actions   are  no 
longer  performed  without  hesitation,  there  results 
antagonism  among  nascent  motor  changes.    The 
element  of  volition   thus  emerges;  but  it  dis- 
appears again  when    actions   which  were    once 
voluntary  are  so  frequently  repeated  that  they 
become  automatic.    On  the  ground  thus  taken, 
the  freedom  of  the  will,  as  commonly  understood, 
must  be  rejected  as  a  subjective  illusion.    'Will 
is  no  more  an  existence  separate  from  the  pre- 
dominant feeling,  than  a  king  is  an  existence 
separate  from  the  man  occupying  the  throne/ 

Such  being  the  basis  of  Spencer's  evolutionary 
psychology,  his  treatment  of  the  question  at  issue 
between  the  empiricists  and  the  intuitionalists 
will  be  foreseen.  The  empiricists  assert  that  all 
ideas  without  exception  are  derived  from  experi- 
ence. The  intuitionalists  reply  that  certain  of 
our  ideas  transcend  experience  and  are  innate. 
Spencer  offers  an  eirenicon  in  the  doctrine  that 
ideas  which  have  arisen  through  immense  ac- 
cumulations   of    experience    in    the   race   may 

46 


'  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY ' 

become  so  completely  organised  as  to  appear  as 
intuitions  in  the  individual.     Such,  he  argues,  is 
the  genetic  history  of  our  ideas  of  space  and  time. 
The  indissoluble    mental  relations    constituting 
such  ideas  have  been  formed  in  response  to  ex- 
ternal relations  which  are  absolutely  constant  and 
universal.    To  these  relations,  therefore,  all  organ- 
isms have  been  exposed  at  all  instants  of  their 
waking  lives.    The  ideas  of  space  and  time,  then, 
being  the  outcome  of  an  absolutely  constant  and 
universal  relation  between  the  organism  and  the 
environment,  are  consolidated  into  mental  states, 
the  cohesion  of  which  cannot  be  destroyed.    In 
the  same  way  Spencer  reaches  his  theory  of  the 
Universal  Postulate   or  Test  of  Truth.     In  an 
ultimate  analysis,  it  is  contended,  we  accept  a 
proposition  as  axiomatic  when  its  negation  is  in- 
conceivable ;  and  the  negation  of  a  proposition  is 
inconceivable  when  the  terms  of  it  have  been  so 
perpetually  connected  in  universal  experience  as 
to  have  become    indissolubly  welded   together. 
In  thus  explaining  individual  intuitions  as  con- 
solidated results  of  racial  experience,  Spencer  of 
course  rests  his  case  upon  the  supposition  that 
the  results  of  experience  are  transmitted  in  the 
form  of  changes  in  nervous  organisation.    In  con- 
sidering his  interpretation,  we  have  therefore  to 

47 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

remember  that,  as  I  have  said,  this  theory  is  still 
under  discussion. 

Spencer's  aim  in  his  Psychology  is  to  trace  the 
evolution  of  psychical  phenomena  side  by  side 
with  that  of  their  physical  mechanism,  as  two 
aspects  of  one  and  the  same  process.  He  is,  how- 
ever, most  solicitous  to  guard  himself  against  the 
charge  of  materialism  which  might  therefore  be 
laid  against  him.  As  we  know  life  only  through 
its  phenomenal  manifestations,  so  we  know  mind 
only  through  its  phenomenal  manifestations ;  and 
as  there  is  a  dynamic  element  in  life  which  eludes 
all  our  analysis,  so  there  is  such  a  dynamic 
element  in  mind.  The  '  subject '  cannot  be  re- 
solved into  states  of  consciousness.  It  is  'the 
unknown  permanent  nexus  .  .  .  which  holds  states 
of  consciousness  together.'  The  Ego  which  con- 
tinuously survives  its  changing  states  can  only  be 
regarded  as  '  that  portion  of  the  Unknowable 
Power  which  is  statically  conditioned  in  special 
nervous  structures  pervaded  by  a  dynamically 
conditioned  portion  of  the  Unknowable  Power 
called  Energy.'  No  explanation  can  therefore .  be 
given  of  the  connection  between  intelligence  and 
its  mechanism.  After  subjection  to  the  most 
searching  analysis,  'mind  still  continues  to  us 
something  without  any  kinship  to  other  things.' 

48 


! 


'  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY ' 

'  Were  we  compelled  to  choose  between  the  alter- 
natives of  translating  mental  phenomena  into 
physical  phenomena,  or  of  translating  physical 
phenomena  into  mental  phenomena,  the  latter 
alternative  would  seem  the  more  acceptable  of 
the  two ' ;  the  translation  of  '  so-called  Spirit  into 
so-called  Matter '  being,  indeed,  '  wholly  impos- 
sible.' But  Mind  and  Matter  are  only  symbols  of 
an  Ultimate  Reality  underlying  both;  and  the 
whole  question  at  issue  is  in  fact  '  nothing  more 
than  the  question  whether  these  symbols  should 
be  expressed  in  terms  of  those  or  those  in  terms 
of  these — a  question  scarcely  worth  deciding, 
since  either  answer  leaves  us  as  completely  out- 
side of  the  reality  as  we  were  at  first.' 

Whatever  may  be  made  of  this  contention,  it  is 
evident  that  in  Spender's  psychology  we  are  a 
long  way  away  from  the  crude  materialism  which 
once  taught  that  the  brain  secretes  thought  as  the 
liver  secretes  bile,  and  from  all  attempts  to  estab- 
lish the  identity  of  the  physical  accompaniments 
of  consciousness  as  we  know  it  and  consciousness 
itself.  Those  who  uphold  the  spiritualistic  view 
are  well  entitled  to  describe  Spencer's  concessions 
as  enormous  and  far-reaching. 


D 


49 


CHAPTER  V 

'THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  SOCIOLOGY* 

Feom  the  phenomena  of  life  and  mind  as  ex- 
Sd  in  the  individual  organism,  Spencer  passes 
meven  more  -plex  P^^enomena  w..^^^ 
.e  presented  hy  ag,.gates  ;^;— ^e^^ 
in  the  associated  state,  we 
of  what  he  calls  super-organic  evolution.  But  m 
:L  Eeld  .e  must  pm.ue  t  e  ^^^J-^^^^ 

l^bkgeneralisations  concerning  the  ongm. 
^  wS  aid  significance  of  social  structures  and 
r:^oCand'to  interpret  these  by  reference  to 
,,e  ultimate  ^-s  of  u^^^^^  e^^on.^  ^^  ^^^ 
Our  starting-po  nt    s  the  P       .^ 

'-'Z  oT;:  S  e:Ln:eLy  of  the  Social 
ZanL  In  four  important  ways  he  shows  that 
rSy  .esembles  an  ^^^^^ZJ^, 
the  first  place,  it  increases  m  mass.    &  y 

50 


'THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  SOCIOLOGY' 

while  it  grows,  it  increases  continually  in  com- 
plexity of  structure.     Thirdly,  this  increase  of 
complexity  is  accompanied  by  corresponding  in- 
tegration ;  the  parts  become  more  and  more  inter- 
dependent, till  at  length  the  life  and  activity  of 
each  part  is  involved  with  the  life  and  activity 
of  the  rest.     Finally,  the  life  and  development  of 
the  whole  are  independent  of  the  life  and  develop- 
ment of  the  component  units,  which  are  bom,  grow, 
give  birth  to  other  units,  and  die,  while  the  body 
politic  continues  to  live,  grow,  and  increase  in  the 
organic  completeness  of  its  structure.    Further 
analogies  are  also  indicated.  In  the  social  organism 
there  is  a  sustaining  system,  composed  of  its  in- 
dustrial agencies ;  a  distributing  system,  composed 
of  its  commercial  agencies ;  a  regulative  system, 
composed  of  its  various  governmental  agencies. 
It  is  true  that  at  several  important  points  the 
comparison  fails.    Societies  have  no  specific  exter- 
nal forms ;  their  units  are  dispersed  individuals, 
while  the  living  tissue  of  an  individual  organism 
constitutes  a  continuous  mass;  social  units  are 
capable  of  moving  from  place  to  place,  while  the 
ultimate    living    elements     of     an     individual 
organism  are  usually  fixed  in  their  relative  posi- 
tions;  and— more   fundamental   than  all— in  a 
society  all  the  members  are  endowed  with  feeling, 

SI 


I 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

while  in  the  body  of  an  animal  the  power  of 
feeling  is  limited  to  a  specialised  tissue.    These 
differences-the    importance  of  which  Spencer 
attempts  with  much  ingenuity  to    minimise- 
suffice  to  show  that,  suggestive  as  the  parallelism 
is  it  may  easily  become  misleading.    It  is  pro- 
bable, indeed,  that  Spencer's  influence  has  led 
many  sociologists  to  take  too  narrowly  biological 
a  view  of  their  subject.    But  the  conception  of  the 
organic  nature  of  society  is  the  foundation  of  the 
Spencerian  sociology.     That  it  is  essentially  an 
evolutionary    conception    is    evident,   smce    it 
excludes  '  the  notion  of  manufacture  or  artificial 
arrangement,'  and  asserts  instead  the  principle  of 
'  natural  development.' 

Society,  then,  like  the    individual  organism, 
evolves;  that  is,  it  undergoes  in  the  course  of 
development  both   differentiation    and  mtegra- 
tion      In  the  1nwest_social  groups,  organmtion 
is  at  most  onlyraHSi^ry.    Practicall^L^mo- 
>  -I^J^SIiniTiw^iSi^Tor  the  only  marked  differ- 
l  eii^S'^^hose  which  accompany  difference  ot 
sex-a  savage  tribe  is  scarcely  more  than.  aJoQSg, 
cluster  of  families  ijving,  together Jndeed,  but 
,    exhibiti^lit^JSterdeEendence..  Specialisation 

*   WTiaraiy  begun,-   Like  ff^^^^'^^^^  i''^^ 
functions.    '  Every  man  is  wa^ior\^uiite^  fisher- 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  SOCIOLOGY ' 


man,  tool-maker,  builder ;  every  woman  performs 
the  same  drudgeries ' ;  Vhile,  except  within  the 
family  group  itself,  ther\  is  little  indication  of 
any  distinction  of  governing  and  governed.!. 
Mutual  dependence  among  these  unspecialised '; 
units  is  in7act  so  slight  that  'every  family  is 
self-suflScing,  and,  save  for  purposes  of  aggression 
and  defence,  mfght  as  well  live  apart  from  the 
rest.'  At  the  other~eirreme,^we"''Eave  our  enor- 
mously complex  modern  societies  which,  in  both 
their  political  and  their  industrial  systems,  present 
a  vast  and  ever-increasing  number  of  highly  speci- 
alised parts  performing  unlike  functions  as  inter- 
dependent elements  of  an  organic  whole.  Thus 
social  progress  is  brought  under  the  general  law 
of  evolution.  Beginning  in  a  condition  of  relative 
simplicity,  social  aggregates,  and  presently  the 
larger  aggregates  which  arise  from  the  compound- 
ing and  recompiguiiding  of  these,  develop  through 
successive  differentiations  and  integrations  in 
heterogeneity,  definiteness,"and  coherence.  Two 
important  truths  here  come  to  light.  In  the 
social,  as  in  the  individual  organism,  repetition 
of  similar  parts  denotes  a  relatively  low  stage 
of  development.  In  both  cases,  specialisation  of 
parts  can  arise  only  on  condition  that,  for  the  due 
performance  of  its  own  parTicular  functions,  each 

S3 


\l 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

organ  shall  be  relieved  by  other  organs  of  the 
necessity  of  carrying  on  other  functions. 

As  super-organic  evolution  presents  the  same 
essential  characteristics  as  organic  evolution,  it  is 
a  natural  inference  that  it  arises  from  the  opera- 
tion of  the  same  causes.  Interpreting  social 
progress  as  the  necessary  result  of  the  instability 
of  the  homogeneous,  the  multiplication  of  effects, 
and  segregation,  Spencer  is  able  to  restate  his 
generalisations  in  deductive  form,  and  to  affiliate 
his  sociology  upon  the  general  body  of  his  philo- 
sophy. Every  law  of  the  evolutionary  process 
will  thus  be  found  illustrated  on  a  gigantic  scale 
I  in  the  intricate  phases  of  social  change.  In  the 
domain  of  the  super-organic,  therefore,  as  in  that 
of  the  organic, '  equilibration  is  the  final  result ' 
of  the  '  transformations  which  an  evolving  aggre- 
gate undergoes.'  The  tendency  of  all  social 
development,  through  countless  rhythmical  varia- 
tions, is  towards  a  state  of  moving  equilibrium. 
Each  society  displays  this  process  '  in  the  con- 
tinuous adjustment  of  its  population  to  its  means 
of  subsistence ' ;  in  the  industrial  phenomena  of 
supply  and  demand ;  in  the  gradual  moulding  of 
governmental  institutions  into  more  and  more 
complete  harmony  with  the  natures  of  the  people. 
As  in  the  individual,  so  in  the  social  organism, 

54 


'  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  SOCIOLOGY ' 

functional  modifications  are  followed  by  modifi- 
cations of  structure.  As  in  the  one  case,  so  in 
the  other, '  increase  of  heterogeneity  must  go  on 
while  there  remain  any  outer  relations  affecting 
the  organism  which  are  unbalanced  by  inner 
relations.'  Each  increment  of  heterogeneity  in 
the  individual  as  social  unit  therefore  implies 
*some  increase  of  heterogeneity  in  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  aggregate  of  individuals'  But  the 
perpetual  interaction  between  the  individual  and 
the  aggregate  must,  in  the  course  of  ages,  bring 
about  such  corresponding  modifications  on  the 
one  side  and  the  other  as  to  lead  at  length  to 
an  approximately  complete  adjustment  between 

the  two. 

The  most  important  aspect  of  this  evolutionary 
process  is  the  gradual  shaping  of  the  individual 
to  the  requirements  of  the  associated  state.  The 
social  man  is  the  product  of  society.  It  is  by  the 
prolonged  and  severe  discipline  of  corporate  life 
that  the  aggressive  egoism  of  primitive  savagery 
has  been  restrained  and  controlled,  and  the 
altruistic  nature  fostered  and  strengthened.  De- 
veloping civilisation  results  from  developing 
humanitv,  and  in  turn  makes  for  the  further 
development  of  humanity. 

In  this  making  of  the  social  man  much  has 

55 


HERBERT  SPENCER 


:i 


throughout  depended  upon  the  elementary  con- 
ditions of  group-life.  Potential  sociality  pre- 
supposed, the  origin  of  all  society  is  to  be  found 
in  the  fact  that  association  gave  men  an  immense 
advantage  in  the  struggle  for  existence."  Bf 
mutujal  aid,  alike/  in  warlike  "and  in  p©«tceful 
activities,  they  were  able  ^6  resist^>eifemies  and 
to  provide  for  wants  iar  mojc  successfully  by 
combination  t^an  s^arately.  The  better  the 
association  the  greater  the  advantage.  But  co- 
operation in  its  simplest  form  implies  some 
amount  of  self-denial,  and  with  the  growth  of 
co-operation,  as  society  evolves,  the  necessity  for 
self-denial  continues  up  to  a  certain  point  to 
increase.  To  gain  the  advantage  of  the  associated 
state  men  must  learn  to  subordinate  personal 
welfare  to  the  welfare  of  the  group. 

So  important  indeed  does  subordination  become 
that  powerful  agencies  of  coercion  begin  to  evolve 
as  soon  as  group-life  passes  into  permanent  form. 
Society  takes  complete  control  of  the  individual 
and  proceeds  to  break  down  his  crude  egoism 
and  to  drill  him  into  line  with  its  own  needs.  It 
does  this  by  bringing  to  bear  upon  him  the  com- 
bined force  of  state-authority,  with  its  temporal 
punishments,  of  religion,  with  its  supernatural 
rewards  and  penalties,  and  of  custom,  with  its 

56 


1.' 

i 


^ 


'  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  SOCIOLOGY ' 

less  defined  but  hardly  less  effective  instruments 
of  social  approval  and  condemnation.  Of  such 
agencies,  the  first  originates  in  fear  of  the  living 
ruler ;  the  second,  in  fear  of  the  dead  ancestor  or 
chief;  the  third,  in  fear  of  the  group.  They  have, 
of  course,  undergone  enormous  transformations 
in  the  process  of  social  differentiation  and  inte- 
gration. But  whatever  shapes  they  may  have 
assumed,  the  political,  ecclesiastical,  and  cere- 
monial institutions  in  which  they  have  been 
respectively  embodied  have  always  been  the  great 
factors  in  the  evolution  of  the  social  man.  The 
race  has  been  educated  by  force  and  fear. 

It  must  not,  however,  be  assumed  that  man  is 
to  be  permanently  subjected  to  the  tyranny  of 
such  external  authorities.  '  Within  each  em- 
bodied set  of  restraining  agencies  .  .  .  there 
gradually  evolves  a  special  kind  of  disembodied 
control,  which  eventually  becomes  independent.' 
Political  government  habituates  men  'to  obey 
regulations  conducive  to  social  order ' ;  there 
presently  emerges  '  a  consciousness  that  these 
regulations  have  not  simply  an  extrinsic  authority 
derived  from  a  ruler's  will,  but  have  an  intrinsic 
authority  derived  from  their  utility  * ;  the  dictates 
of  the  king,  often  arbitrary  and  irrational, '  grow 
into  an  established  system  of  laws,  which  formu- 

57 


HERBERT  SPENCER 


^ 


I! 


i 


late  the  needful  limitations  to  men's  actions  aris- 
ing from  one  another's  claims ' ;  and  these  limita- 
tions '  men  more  and  more  recognise  and  conform 
to'  without  any  thought  of  regal  command  or 
parliamentary  enactment.  '  Out  of  the  supposed 
wishes  of  the  ancestral  ghost,  which  now  and 
again  developing  into  the  traditional  commands 
of  some  expanded  ghost  of  a  great  man,  become 
divine  injunctions,  arises  the  set  of  requirements 
classed  as  rehgious ' ;  little  by  little  within  these 

*  there  evolve  the  rules  we  distinguish  as  moral ' ; 
such  rules,  at  first  obeyed  only  because  of  their 
supposedly  sacred  origin,  come  ultimately  to  be 
regarded  as  imperative  because  of '  their  observed 
utiUty  in   controlling    certain   parts    of   human 
conduct  .  .  .  not  controlled,  or  little  controlled, 
by  civil   law.'      Similarly    with   the    ceremonial 
code.    '  From  observances  which,  in  their  primi- 
tive  forms,  express    partly   subordination    to  a 
superior    and    partly   attachment    to    him,  and 
which,    spreading    downwards,    become    general 
forms  of  behaviour,  there  finally  come  observ- 
ances expressing  a  proper  regard  for  the  indi- 
vidualities of  other  persons,  and  a  true  sympathy 

I  in  their  welfare.'  Social  evolution  in  its  higher 
I  stages,  therefore,  means  the  gradual  liberation  of 
1  men  from  all  forms  of  control  by  external  autho- 

*  58 


*  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  SOCIOLOGY 


, 


V 


rity.  But  this  can  be  achieved  only  in  pro- 
portion as — the  discipline  of  external  authority 
having  done  its  work — men  may  safely  be  left  to 
be  a  law  unto  themselves. 

A  further  fact  of  great  importance  has  now 
to  be  recognised.  From  pressure  of  population 
and  other  causes  has  arisen  an  almost  incessant 
struggle  for  existence  among  social  groups.  This 
struggle  has  throughout  been  the  main  factor  in 
the  compounding  and  recompounding  of  such 
groups  into  larger  and  larger  aggregates  and  in 
social  consolidation.  War,  therefore,  has  every- 
where played  an  enormous  part  in  social  evolution, 
for  it  is  mainly  by  war  that  great  communities 
have  been  formed  and  their  structures  developed. 
But  in  proportion  as  social  integration  advances, 
war  necessarily  declines.  As  an  agent  of  progress 
it  is  in  fact  self-destructive.  By  the  formation 
of  larger  and  larger  organic  masses  it  brings 
about  industrial  co-operation  over  wider  and 
wider  areas.  We  may  therefore  anticipate  a 
time — far  distant  though  it  may  be — when  the 
struggle  for  existence  among  civilised  nations 
— themselves  interdependent  parts  of  a  vast 
industrial  community — will  entirely  disappear. 
'As,  when  small  tribes  were  welded  into  great 
tribes,   the   head-chief  stopped   intertribal  war- 

59 


y 


J 


^W| 


\ 

f 

I 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

fare ;  as,  when  small  feudal  governments  became 
subject  to  a  king,  feudal  wars  were  prevented  by 
him ;  so,  in  time  to  come,  a  federation  of  the 
highest  nations,  exercising  supreme  authority 
(already  foreshadowed  by  occasional  agreements 
among  "the  Powers")  may,  by  forbidding  wars 
between  any  of  its  constituent  nations,  put  an 
end  to  the  rebarbarisation  which  is  continually 
undoing  civilisation.' 

The  results,  in  the  internal  life  of  society,  of 
this  world-movement  from  militarism  to  indus- 
trialism must  also  be  noted.  Social  structures 
depend  on  social  needs  and  activities.  With  the 
decline  of  the  struggle  for  existence  and  the 
growth  of  mutual  aid  among  nations,  political 
organisations  therefore  pass  out  of  forms  appro- 
priate to  a  state  of  almost  chronic  warfare  to 
forms  appropriate  to  a  state  of  well-established 
peace.  Great  prominence  is  given  in  the  Spen- 
cerian  sociology  to  the  contrast  between  the 
militant  and  the  industrial  types  of  society.  It 
is  true,  indeed,  that  during  social  evolution  there 
has  '  habitually  been  a  mingling  of  the  two,'  and 
that  no  civilised  nation  has  yet  advanced  beyond 
the  transitional  stage.  Yet  'it  is  possible  to 
trace  with  due  clearness  those  opposite  characters 
which  distinguish  them  in  their  respective  com- 

60 


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'  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  SOCIOLOGY ' 

plete    developments.'     While    the    struggle  for 
existence  continues,  the  first  concern  of  the  state 
is  its  own  preservation.     Everything  else  is  made 
secondary  to  that.     Hence,  in  the  militant  type 
of  society,  the  individual  is  owned  by  the  state ; 
corporate  action  is  secured  by  despotic  centrahsed 
control ;  life  is  ordered  on  the  principles  of  regi- 
mentation;  and  government  pursues  the  citizen 
into   the  details    of   his    private    interests  and 
enterprises.     But  when  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence subsides,  and  the  state  is  no  longer  jeopar- 
dised from  without,  all  need,  and  therefore  all 
ethical  warrant,  for  the  coercion  of  the  individual 
by   the  state  necessarily  lapse.     Hence  in  the 
industrial    type  of  society  '  the    citizen's    indi- 
viduality' emerges  as  the  primary  consideration; 
the   protection  of    this   becomes  '  the   society's 
essential  duty ' ;  despotic  centralised  control  and 
all   the    elaborate    machinery   of  regimentation 
disappear;   the  range  of  governmental  activity 
shrinks   to   the  task  of  maintaining  'the  con- 
ditions requisite  for  the  highest  individual  life ' ; 
and  the  state  ceases  to  interfere  with  the  citizen's 
private  concerns.    The  inference  is  obvious.    The 
evolution  of  society  from  the  regime  of  enforced 
co-operation   resulting    from   militarism,  to  the 
regime  of  voluntary  co-operation  resulting  from 

61 


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HERBERT  SPENCER 

industrialism,  is  necessarily  attended  by  the  re- 
duction of  state  control  to  the  minimum  required 
for  the   purposes  of  co-operative  life,  and   the 
expansion  of  individual  liberty  to  the  maximum 
possible  in  the  associated  state.    Following  the 
lines  of  social  evolution,  Spencer  thus  reaches 
that   principle   of  individualism   which,   clearly 
enunciated  in  his  very  first  essay — the  Letters  on 
the    Proper  Sphere    of   Government — remained 
throughout  the  central  thesis  of  all  his  political 
teaching.     Any  movement  towards  the  enlarge- 
ment of  the  power  of  the  state,  and  therefore  all 
forms  of  socialism,  are  thus  condemned  by  him 
as  retrograde  efforts  to  revive  in  industrial  com- 
munities a  form  of  social  organisation  fitted  only 
to  the  regime  of  militarism.     This  doctrine  is 
further  reinforced  by  the  principle  of  specialisa- 
tion.    The  true  function  of  government  is  the 
maintenance  of  equitable  relations  among  citizens; 
and  as  it  fits  itself  more  and  more  completely 
for  the  due  performance  of  this,  it  becomes  of 
necessity  correspondingly  unfit  for  anything  else. 
Moreover,  Spencer  finds  his  analogy  between  the 
social  and   individual   organisms   fall   into  line 
with  his  argument  precisely  at  the  point  where 
it  most    conspicuously  breaks   down.     For  the 
individual  organism  has  a  corporate  conscious- 

62 


<  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  SOCIOLOGY 

ness,  while  in  the  social  organism  consciousness 
exists  only  in  the  individual  members.  In  a 
community,  therefore,  '  the  corporate  life  must 
...  be  subservient  to  the  lives  of  the  parts, 
instead  of  the  lives  of  the  parts  being  subservient 
to  the  corporate  life.'  The  individual  does  not 
exist  for  the  state.  The  state  exists  for  the 
individual. 


^ 


63 


CHAPTER   VI 

'THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  ETHICS* 

The  science  of  ethics,  according  to  Spencer,  has  for 
its  subject-matter  those  '  last  stages  in  the  evolu- 
tion  of  conduct '  which  are  '  displayed  by  the  | 
highest  type  of  being,  when  he  is  forced,  by  increase 
of  numbers,  to  live  more  and  more  in  presence  of 
his  fellows/    Conduct  at  large  is  distinguished  as 
the  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends,  and  the  evolution 
of  conduct  is  seen  to  conform  to  the  general  law 
of  evolution,  since,  as  we  ascend  the  scale  of  life, 
we  find  increase  at  once  of  heterogeneity  and  of 
definiteness  in  such  adjustments.     These  adjust- 
ments may  be  contemplated  under  a  threefold 
aspect.    There  are,  first,  those  which  subserve  indi- 
vidual Ufe.    There  are,  secondly,  those  which  sub- 
serve the  life  of  the  species.     These  two  kinds  of 
conduct,  which  are  throughout  interdependent 
and  therefore  evolve  together,  comprise  all  the 
adjustments   that   are  called  for  in  the  case  of 

64 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  ETHICS 


non-gregarious  creatures.  But  the  moment  we 
pass  from  creatures  leading  solitary  to  those 
leading  associated  lives,  a  third  set  of  adjustments 
is  required — those  which  subserve  the  life  of  the 
group.  With  the  evolution  of  the  associated 
state  these  often  become  of  pre-eminent  import- 
ance. But  those  adjustments  which  make  for  the 
life  of  the  individual  and  for  the  life  of  the  race 
are,  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases,  more  success- 
fully made  in  the  associated  state  than  in  the 
solitary  state.  Co-operation  brings  with  it  the 
opportunity  of  a  fuller  life  for  all  the  units. 
'  Living  together  arose  because,  on  the  average,  it 
proved  more  advantageous  to  each  than  living 
apart ;  and  this  implies  that  maintenance  of  com- 
bination is  maintenance  of  the  conditions  to  more 
satisfactory  living  than  the  combined  persons 
would  otherwise  have.' 

An  important  truth  is  thus  brought  to  light. 

'  The  evolution  of  conduct — the  more  and  more 
complete  adaptation  of  means  to  more  and  more 
varied  ends — has  clearly   tended  from  the  first 

/  to  increasing  fulness  of  life.  Adopting  for  the 
moment  the  language  of  teleology,  we  may  there- 
fore say  that  increasing  fulness  of  life  is  the  '  end ' 
of  evolution.  This  is  an  induction  from  the 
phenomena  of  evolving  life.  We  may  now  trans- 
E  65 


L 


Si 


If   I 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

late  the  conclusion  reached  into  the  vocabulary  ot 
ethical  judgment.  Conduct  which  is  relatively 
highly  evolved  is  what  we  call  good  conduct. 
Conduct  which  we  describe  as  good  'rises  to 
conduct  we  conceive  as  best'  when  it  'simul- 
taneously achieves  the  greatest  totahty  of 
life  in  self,  in  offspring,  and  in  fellow  men.' 
Otherwise  phrased,  the  '  highest  conduct  is  that 
which  conduces  to  the  greatest  length,  breadth, 
and  completeness  of  life.' 

A  principle  of  the  profoundest  moral  signifi- 
cance is  thus  introduced.    Following  the  evolu- 
tion of  Ufe  from  stage  to  stage,  we  find  that 
conduct  is  adjusted  less  and  less  to  immediate 
and  personal  ends  merely,  and  more  and  more  to 
ends  that  are  remote  and  impersonal.    This  means 
that  in  the  evolution  of  hfe  the  impulses  of  the 
moment  are  more  and  more  overruled  by  impulses 
of  wider  derivation.    In  cases  of  conflict,  this 
implies  subordination  of  the  claims  of  the  present 
to  those  of  the  future  in  the  conduct  of  the  indi- 
vidual acting  in  the  interests  of  self ;  subordination 
of  self  for  the  welfare  of  the  species ;  subordina- 
tion of  the  unit  for  the  preservation  of  the  group. 
The  conclusion  is  that,  speaking  generally,  life  is 
made  fuller  and  richer-the  '  end '  of  conduct  is 
more  perfectly  attained— when  the  earlier-evolved 

66 


, 


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I 


'  THE  PKINCIPLES  OF  ETHICS ' 

and  therefore  lower  impulses  are  governed  by 
those  that  are  later-evolved  and  therefore  higher. 
The  'end'  is  not  fulness  of  individual  life,  but 
fulness  of  life  at  large. 

If,  however,  fulness  of  life  is  to  be  postulated 
not  only  as  the  '  end '  of  evolution  but  also  as  a 
desirable  end — if,  in  other  words,  we  may  properly 
consider  it  as  our  duty  to  co-operate  with  the 
processes  which  make  towards  it — the  assump- 
tion is  clearly  required  that  life  as  a  whole 
brings  with  it  more  pleasure  than  pain.  We 
are  therefore  committed  to  Hedonism.  'There 
is  no  escape  from  the  admission  that  in  calling 
good  the  conduct  which  subserves  life,  and 
bad  the  conduct  which  hinders  or  destroys  it, 
we  are  inevitably  asserting  that  conduct  is  good 
or  bad  as  its  total  effects  are  pleasurable  or 
painful.' 

In  this  way  Spencer  joins  hand  with  those 
who  assert  that  virtue  is  not  an  end  in  itself  but 
the  means  to  an  end,  and  who  hold,  as  Mill  put 
it,  '  that  actions  are  right  in  proportion  as  the^ 
tend  to  promote  happiness ;  wrong,  as  they  ten( 
to  produce  the  reverse  of  happiness.'  In  regard  to 
the  first  of  the  two  great  questions  with  which 
ethical  theory  is  specially  concerned — that  of  the 
ultimate  standard  of  conduct—he  thus  adopts  the 

6j 


V. 


9 

1 


f 


^<i> 


I 


<l 


^^^^^^^^^^  • 


^f( 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

utilitarian  point  of  view.     In  common  with  the 
utilitarians  in  general,  he    therefore  falls    into 
several  serious  mistakes.     Neglecting  the  element 
of  character  and  motive,  he  treats  ethics  as  con- 
cerned only  with  '  conduct  considered  objectively 
as  producing  good  or  bad  results.'     He  fails  to 
grasp  the  fundamental  difference  in  quality  be- 
tween different  kinds  of  happiness,  and  to  see 
that,  as  pleasure  varies  with  character,  it  can  be 
(^    properly  evaluated  only  when  character  is  taken 
into  account.    He  quite  overlooks  the  enormously 
important  problem  of  the  reaction  of  action  on 
character.      And    he    distinctly   enunciates    the 
principle  that  the  extent  to  which  any  concomi- 
tant of  pain  enters  anywhere  into  the  consequences 
of  an  action  is  the  measure  of  the  extent  to  which 
it  fails  to  reach  the  standard  of  the  absolutely 
right— a  view  which  leads  him  into  some  extra- 
ordinary vagaries  of  reasoning.    Yet  he  breaks  at 
one  most  important  point  with  the  crude  expedi-^ 
ency-morality  of    the   older  utilitarian    schools. 
These  had  not  advanced   beyond  the  empirical 
stage  of  ethical  inquiry.    They  had  rested   in 
generalisations,  and  had  therefore  in  their  inter- 
pretation of  conduct  got  no  further  than   the 
direct    estimation    of   results.     Spencer,    as    we 
have    already    seen,    maintained  that  in   every 

68 


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*  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  ETHICS ' 

science  the  work  of  induction  has  to  be  completed 
by  deduction.  In  his  view  there  could  thus  be 
no  real  science  of  ethics  until  the  principles  of 
conduct  had  been  translated  from  truths  of  the 
empirical  into  truths  of  the  rational  order.  '  I  / 
conceive  it  to  be  the  business  of  moral  science,'  he 
wrote  to  Mill, '  to  deduce  from  the  laws  of  life  and 
the  conditions  of  existence  what  kinds  of  conduct 
necessarily  tend  to  produce  happiness  and  what 
kinds  to  produce  unhappiness.  Having  done 
this,'  he  significantly  adds,  *  its  deductions  are  to  be 
recognised  as  laws  of  conduct,  and  are  to  be  con- 
formed to,  irrespective  of  a  direct  estimation  of 
happiness  or  misery.'  This  marks  an  immense 
advance  upon  the  older  Hedonistic  position. 
Spencer's  attempt  to  reconstn^^t^.  natnralistip, 
rthirr.  npnn  a  dniluftiiYf;  l;?ftsis  is  undoubtedly  to 
be  regarded  as  his  most  important  contribution 
moral  theory.  He  demurred,  indeed,  and 
rightly,  when  Mill  classed  him  among  tlia.anti-> 
*sjtilit^rians.^  Yet  his  ethical  system  manifestly 
rests  on  foundations  widely  difierent  from  those 
of  expediency,  since,  while  recognising  happiness 
as  the  ultimate  end  of  conduct,  he  detached  the 
principles  of  right  living  from  all  consideration  of 
happiness  as  its  proximate  end.  Though  accept 
ing  the  Hedonistic  criterion,  he  was  thus  able,  t 

69 


t 


L 


I 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

the  great  advantage  to   his    system,    to    reject/^ 
entirely  the  Hedonistic  calculus. 
pfs       To  the  other  great  question  of  ethical  theory 
'  ^    —that  of  the  faculty  within  us  which  answers  to 
the  distinction  between  right  and  wrong— Spencer 
of  course  replies  in  terms  of  his  evolutionary  psy- 
chology.   He  interprets  the  genesis  of  the  moral 
sense  as  he  has  already  interpreted  that  of  our 
ideas  of  space  and  time.    Our  '  moral  intuitions 
are  the  results  of   accumulated  experiences  of 
utility,  gradually  .  .  .  organised  and  consolidated 
through  all  past  generations  of  the  human  race. 
These    experiences,    it    is    argued,    'have    been 
producing  corresponding  nervous   modifications 
which,  by  continued  transmission  and  accumula- 
tion, have  become  in  us  certain  faculties  of  moral 
intuition— certain  emotions  responding  to  right 
and  wrong  conduct,  which  have  no  apparent  basis 
in  the  individual  experiences  of  utility,'  and  have 
indeed  become  in  the    modern    civilised  adult 
'  quite  independent  of  conscious  experience.'    In 
this  way  he  once  more  enters  the  field  as  mediator 
between  the  empiricists  and  the  intuitionalistSc 
As  his  account  of  the  genesis  and  growth  of  con- 
science must,  in  any  event,  stand  or  fall  with  the 
theory  of  the  transmissibility  of  acquired  char- 
acters, it  is  evident  that  for  the  present  it  remains 

70 


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'  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  ETHICS ' 

in  the  domain  of  hypothesis.  But  even  if  we 
grant  the  foundation  of  his  argument,  it  is  still 
open  to  question  whether  the  proposed  interpre- 
tation is  not  more  ingenious  than  convincing,  and 
whether  any  doctrine  which  rests  on  the  mere 
consolidation  of  the  results  of  the  experiences  of 
utility  in  the  race  will  satisfy  us  as  an  adequate 
explanation  of  the  authoritativeness  of  conscience 
and  its  emphatic  report  of  the  difference  between 
the  expedient  and  the  right.  At  the  same  time, 
Spencer's  system  gains  much  because,  so  far  as 
the  individual  is  concerned,  he  is  able  to  yield  so 
much  to  intuitivism. 

As  the  end  of  conduct  is  complete  living,  and 
as  this  end  can  be  achieved  only  when  all  activi- 
ties, as  they  subserve  the  life  of  individual,  of 
species,  and  of  group,  are  duly  harmonised,  it  is 
necessary  to  define  the  conditions  pre-requisite  to 
complete  living,  and  to  define  them  in  such  a  way 
as  to  take  account  of  all  the  activities  involved. 
This  is  done  in  the  formula  of  absolute  justice— 
that '  every  man  is  free  to  do  that  which  he  wills, 
provided  he  infringes  not  the  equal  freedom  of  any 
other  man.'  Each  individual  is  thus  conceived  as 
having  a  right  to  carry  on  all  the  activities  which 
conduce  to  his  own  life  and  to  that  of  his  offspring 
unimpeded  save  by  the  collateral  exercise  of  the 

71 


HERBERT  SPENCER 


f'i 


L 


same  right  by  his  fellows.  This  '  law  of  equal  free- 
dom '  is  to  be  regarded  on  a  priori  and  a  pos- 
teriori grounds,  as  the  '  ultimate  ethical  principle/ 
having  'an  authority  transcending  every  other.' 
It  is  thus  '  the  supreme  moral  law/  This  law  will 
indeed  be  quahfied  among  individuals  by  the 
-  exercise  of  beneficence,  for  life  cannot  reach  its 
highest  until  altruism  has  free  play,  and  the 
'  requirements  of  equity '  are '  supplemented  by  the 
promptings  of  kindness '  and  '  spontaneous  efforts* 
on  the  part  of  each  'to  further  the  welfare  of 
others/  Reciprocal  aid  among  individuals  is 
thus  given  a  lai:ge  place  in  the  development  of 
th^^^ompletest  living.  But  the  exercise  of  benefi- 
.  cence  must  always  remain  a  private  function. 
[/The  function  of  the  state  is  limited  to  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  primary  law  of  social  co-operation — 
the  law  of  justice.  Its  one  business,  as  we  have 
already  said,  is  the  maintenance  of  equitable 
relations  among  the  members  of  a  community. 
It  can  exercise  beneficence  only  by  infringing 
upon  the  rights  of  the  individual  and  thus  break- 
ing the  very  law  it  exists  to  secure.  The  bearings 
of  this  doctrine  upon  the  problem  of  the  functions 
of  the  state  and  the  limits  of  legislation  will  be 
obvious.  Spencer  again  reaches  the  principle  of 
individualism. 

72 


\ 


,\ 


y 


! 


'  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  ETHICS ' 

That  moral  evolution  is  necessarily  bound  up 
with  social  evolution  is  an  inference  which  we 
cannot  fail  to  draw.  We  have  shown  that  social 
evolution  has  throughout  been  a  process  towards 
ever-increasing  solidarity,  (or  the  production  of 
larger  and  larger  organic  wholes  made  up  of 
interdependent  parts),  the  decline  of  the  struggle 
for  existence  between  group  and  group,  and  the 
corresponding  extension  of  industrial  co-operation 
over  ever-widening  areas.  Now,  moral  ideals  and 
sentiments  arise  in  response  to  demands,  and 
moral  sanction  is  stage  by  stage  given  tp  the 
kinds  of  activity  called  for  by  the  average  require- 
ments of  life.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that*  the 
gradual  evolution  of  the  conditions  of  complete 
living  must  be  entirely  contingent  upon  a  gradual 
change  in  society  from  the  military  to  the  indus- 
trial regime.  So  long  as  the  struggle  for  existence 
continues  bet^ji^een  group  and  group,  the  right  of 
the  individual  to  the  unimpeded  exercise  of  his 
own  activity  must,  as  we  have  said,  inevitably  be 
over-ridden  by  the  claims  of  the  group ;  while  the 
spirit  of  antagonism  kept  alive  by  the  struggle 
must  hinder  the  growth  of  sympathetic  feelings 
eY&d  within  the  group  itself.  Moral  evolution 
jl(erefore  depends  upon  the  decline  of  warlike 
^'''activities  and   the  concurrent   reconstruction  of 

73 


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HERBERT  SPENCER 

society  on  an  industrial  and  completely  peaceful 
basis.  Only  thus  can  the  rule  of  absolute  justice 
be  established  and  the  exercise  of  beneficence 
become  general. 

We  are  thus  brought  round  again  to  the  pheno- 
mena of  adaptation.     Moral  evolution^  like  bio; 
logical  and  psychological  evolution,  is  the  resiilt 
of  the  converse  of  the  organism  with  its  environ^ 
ment;   the  environment  in  this  case  being  the 
"whole  evolving  fabric  of  society  and  civilisation. 
Moral  evolution  is  therefore  only  a  phase  of  the 
universal  tendency  towards  equilibration.     'The 
highest  type  of  living  being,  no  less  than  all  lower 
types,  must  go  on  moulding  itself  to  those  require- 
ments which  circumstances  impose.'  How  long  will 
this  process  of  equilibration  continue  ?    Spencer 
replies  that '  the  adaptation  of  man's  nature  to  the 
conditions  of  his  existence  cannot  cease  until  the 
internal  forces  we  know  as  feelings  are  in  equih- 
brium  with  the  external  forces  they  encounter ' ; 
until,  in  other  words, '  a  state  of  human  nature 
and  social  organisation '  is  reached  '  such  that  the 
individual  has  no  desires  but  those  which  may  be 
satisfied  without  exceeding  his  proper  sphere  of 
action,  while  society  maintains  no  restraints  but 
those  which  the  individual  voluntarily  respects/ 
That  sense  of  obligation  which  we  distinguish  as 

74 


% 


'  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  ETHICS  ^ 

moral  is  a  late  product  of  evolving  social  life.   The 
earUer  forms  of  coercion  and  restraint  are,  as  we 
have  seen,  those  created  by  fear  of  outer  authority 
—of  the  gods,  of  political  rulers,  of  society.    Out 
of  these  slowly  emerges  the  moral  form  of  coercion 
and  restraint,  which   is  that   inner  compulsion 
or  inhibition  which  follows  upon  the  realisation 
of  the  intrinsic  character  of  actions  and   their 
necessary  bearings  upon  life.     Yet  this  sense  of 
moral  obligation  is  itself  only  a  stage  in  the  higher 
evolution  of  man.    The  equilibration  between  the 
individual  and  the  conditions  of  the  associated 
state  must  continue  until  moral  conduct  become 
purely  natuial-a^Jnslijictive,  and  all  sense 
compulsion  and  restraint,  even  that  which  arises 
from  within,  alto^^ther  disappears.    Spencer  thtlS 
anticipates   a   firial    balance  ('complete'  in  his 
earlier  view, '  approximately  complete,'  according 
to  his  later  and  more  tempered  statement)  be- 
tween men's  nacres  and  the  highest  possible 
form  of  the  associat^  Ufe.    This  is  presented  as 
the   evolutionary  millennium.     The  vision  may 
seem  attractive.    Yet\on/  the  other  hand  it  may 
surely  be  urged  that  ^^rld  without  moral  effort, 
and  therefore  without  moral  enthusiasm,  would 
after  all  be  a  consummation  hardly  to  be  wished. 


75 


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« 

t 
1 

-1 


CHAPTER  VII 

ON   THE  EVOLUTION   OF   RELIGION 

We  have  seen  that,  while  asserting  an  Absokite 
Reality  behind  appearance  as  the  ultimate  fact  of 
facts,  Spencer  held  that  this  Reality  '  transcends 
not  only  human  knowledge  but  human  conception/ 

iThe  Power  manifested  in  the  phenomenal  universe 
being  itself  inscrutable,  philosophy  must  rest  con- 

(  tent  with  the  study  of  its  manifestations.  All 
questions  of  the  theologico-metaphysical  class  are 
thus  relegated  to  the  category  of  the  Unknowable. 
But  religion  is  practically  universal.  It  has  at  all 
times  filled  an  immense  place  in  human  life.  It 
has  everywhere  played  an  enormous  part  in  the 
development  of  civihsation.  'It  has,  therefore,  to 
be  investigated  as  a  social  phenomenon.  We  are 
thus  committed  to  an  inquiry  into  its  origin  and 
evolution.  This  will  lead  in  turn  to  some  con- 
sideration of  its  probable  changes  in  the  future. 

The  religious  consciousness  is  concerned  with 
that  which  lies  beyond  the  sphere  of  sense.  What 

76 


ON  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  RELIGION 

suggests  the  thought  of  agencies  transcending 
human  perception  ?  How  does  the  supernatural 
evolve  out  of  the  natural  ? 

Spencer  regards  ancestor-worship  as  the  ulti- 
mate root  of  all  religious  ideas  and  ceremonies. 
Such  ancestor- worship  is  explained  by  the  Ghost- 
theory.    The  savage  dreams.    What  he  dreams  is 
to  him  as  real  as  his  waking  experience.    Thus 
arises  the  conception  of  another  world — the  spirit 
world.  If  he  dreams  of  his  dead  father,  he  accepts 
the  dream  image  as  his  father's  double  or  ghost. 
The  other  self  which  wanders  away  in  dreams  and 
returns  to  the  body,  and  which  becomes  visible 
in  shadow  and  reflection,  is  conceived  as  leaving 
the  body  permanently  in  death,  yet  surviving  in 
a  fainter,  though  still  material,  form.      Hence 
arises  the  conception  of  an  after-life.    But  such 
after-life  is,  of  course,  the  counterpart  of  this  life. 
The  double  carries  with  it  into  the  shadow- world 
its  earthly  appetites,  desires,  passions.     The  rela- 
tions of  the  son  to  the  living  father  are  main- 
tained, after  the   father's  death,  with  his  ghost. 
The  dead  man  will  need  food  and  companionship. 
Flesh,  bread,  and  wine  are  laid  upon  his  grave, 
and    there    his  horse  and    dog,  sometimes  his 
slaves,  occasionally  his  wife,  are  slain,  that  their 
spirits  may  accompany  his  own.     Sacrifices  thus 


i 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

originate  which  are  continued  with  the  further 
object  of  pleasing  and  propitiating  the  dead  man, 
and  of  making  him  friendly  to  the  living.    The 
grave,  as  the  spot  which  the  double  is  most  likely 
to  haunt,  becomes  a  place  of  special  resort  and 
veneration.    It  assumes  a  sacred  character.    For 
purposes  of  identification  it  is  at  first  marked  by 
stakes  or  stones.    As  wealth  and  skill  increase,  it 
is  walled  in  and  covered  for  better  protection. 
The  grave  grows  into  a  shrine ;  the  shrine  into  a 
temple.     Hither  the  living  repair  to  minister  by 
oblations  to  the  dead  man's  needs  or  desires,  to 
gratify  him  by  reciting  or  chanting  his  praises,  to 
petition  him  for  help.    Here  we  have  the  begin- 
nings of  religious  worship  and  ritual.  As  a  natural 
result  of  the  influence  of  memory  and  lengthening 
tradition,  the  ghost  undergoes  continual  expan- 
sion, and  little  by  little  becomes  endowed  with 
distinctly  superhuman  characteristics.  Differences 
in  rank  and  power  presently  arise  as  the  inevitable 
consequence  of  such  differences  among  living  men. 
The  ghost  of  the  strong  man,  or  head  of  the  tribe, 
becomes  the  chief  of  the  tribal  ghosts  and  the 
object  of  general  tribal  worship,    With  the  com- 
pounding and   recompounding  of  social  groups 
effected    by    war— changes    in    the   ghost-world 
following  changes  in  society— the  gradations  be- 

7S 


ON  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  RELIGION 

come  more  numerous  and  more  regular.  In  course 
of  time,  while  the  ghosts  of  ordinary  ancestors 
remain  gods,  the  ghosts  of  mighty  conquerors  and 
rulers  grow  into  gods-in-chief.  Mythologies  and 
pantheons  are  thus  consoUdated.  Finally,  with 
the  further  progress  of  moral  and  intellectual 
evolution,  the  national  god-in-chief  becomes  the 
one  universal  God.  The  cult  of  apotheosised 
ancestors  gives  birth  to  polytheism.  Then  when 
the  scattered  supernatural  powers  are  merged  in 
one  supreme  power,  monotheism  arises.  Yet  this 
monotheism  bears  traces  of  its  origin  in  its  sub- 
stantially anthropomorphic  character. 

The  theory  is  ingenious,  and  it  has  an  attractive 
simplicity.  But  it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether, 
despite  the  imposing  array  of  facts  which  Spencer 
marshals  in  its  support,  it  is  really  borne  out  by 
such  evidence  as  is  available  of  the  first  stages  of 
religious  thought  among  primitive  peoples.  Our 
present  business,  however,  is  not  to  discuss,  but 
merely  to  outline  it.  Starting  with  this  interpreta- 
tion of  the  genesis  of  religious  ideas,  Spencer  pro- 
ceeds to  show  that  the  whole  tendency  of  thought' 
during  the  higher  stages  of  culture  and  civilisation 
is  towards  what  Fiske  called  deanthropomorphisa- 
tion.  This  is  due  in  part  to  moral  and  in  part  to 
intellectual  development.    When  monotheism  has 

79 


11 


HERBERT  SPENCER 


11 


ir 


been  reached,  the  conception  of  the  one  supreme 
God  is  gradually  purged  of  manlike  attributes. 
''^^^si:l^ff^he  grosser  attributes— the  more  glaring  moral 
^  ^  imperfections— are,  of  course,  the  first  to  disappear. 

In  the  moral  progress  of  the  race  men  cannot  con- 
tinue  to   ascribe   to  Deity  qualities  which  have 
become  odious  in  humanity.    This  moralisation  of 
the  idea  of  God  is  largely  dependent  upon  the 
gradual  transition  of  society  from  a  condition  of 
chronic  warfare  to  one  of  well-established  peace. 
'Ascribed   characters  of   deities  are  continually 
adapted  and  readapted  to  the  needs  of  the  social 
state.     During  the  militant  phase  of  activity  the 
chief  god  is  conceived  as  holding  insubordination 
as  the  greatest  crime,  as  implacable  in  anger,  as 
merciless  in  punishment;  and  any  alleged  attri- 
butes of  milder  kinds  occupy  but  small  space  in 
the  social  consciousness.      But  when  militancy 
decHnes  and  the  harsh  despotic  form  of  govern- 
ment appropriate  to  it  is  gradually  qualified  by  the 
form  appropriate  to  industrialism,  the  foreground 
of  the  religious  consciousness  is  increasingly  filled 
with  those  ascribed  traits  of  the  divine  nature 
which  are  congruous  with  the  ethics  of  peace; 
divine  love,  divine  mercy,  divine  forgiveness  are 
now  the  characteristics  enlarged  upon.'    Yet  in- 
tellectual progress  entails  the  elimination  of  even 

80 


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1 1- 


ON  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  RELIGION 

these  higher  attributes,  since  it  necessarily  forces 
upon  men  a  more  and  more  distinct  realisation  of 
the  impossibility  of  thinking  of  the  Power  every- 
where revealed  in  the  universe  in  any  terms 
derived  from  human  thought  and  feeling.  Here- 
after, then,  men  will  gradually  drop  '  the  higher 
anthropomorphic  characters  from  the  First  Cause, 
as  they  have  long  since  dropped  the  lower.'  What 
will  be  the  result?  *The  conception  which  has 
been  enlarging  from  the  beginning  must  go  on 
enlarging,  until,  by  disappearance  of  its  limits,  it 
becomes  a  consciousness  which  transcends  the 
forms  of  thought,  though  it  for  ever  remains  a 
consciousness.' 

Spencer  thus  traces  the  growth  of  religious 
ideas  from  that  crudest  anthropomorphism,  in 
which  they  are  alleged  to  have  originated,  to  that 
final  stage  where  all  definite  conceptions  vanish 
and  nothing  is  left  beyond  an  indefinite  though 
inexpugnable  sense  of  Creative  Power  — '  an 
Infinite  and  Eternal  Energy,  from  which  all 
things  proceed.'  But  here  we  are  confronted  by 
a  difficulty.  If  this  account  of  the  transformation 
of  religious  ideas  be  accepted,  have  we  not  also 
to  accept  the  conclusion  which  seems  to  be  in- 
volved in  it  —  that  philosophical  agnosticism, 
which  expresses  our  right  attitude  towards  the 

F  81 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

mystery  of  the  universe,  is  only  the  last  term  in 
the  development  of  thought  out  of  a  conception 
which  was  utterly  untrue?    We  begin  with  the 
savage's  baseless  belief  in  the  material  double  of 
his  dead  ancestor.    Out  of  this,  by  the  process 
of  gradual  expansion  and  dematerialisation,  arises 
the  general  idea  of  supernatural  agencies.     By 
the  continuation  of  the  same  process,  some  of  the 
original  human  attributes  being  dropped  while 
others  are  transfigured,  the  conception  of  Deity 
is  attained.     Then,  deanthropomorphisation  being 
carried  to  its  utmost  limits,  the  ultimate  form  of 
religious  consciousness  is  reached.    The  objection, 
then,  may  clearly  be  urged  that  if  this  ultimate 
form  of  religious  consciousness  is  to  be  interpreted 
as  emerging  out  of  primitive  superstition,  it,  too, 
must  be  condemned  as  merely  a  refinement  of 
superstition.    '  Surely  if  the  primitive  belief  was 
absolutely    false,    all    derived    beliefs    must    be 
absolutely  false.' 

Admitting  that  the  objection  looks  fatal, 
Spencer  replies  that  it  is  not  really  so  because 
its  premiss  is  not  valid.  The  primitive  belief  was 
not  absolutely  false.  It  contained  an  element  of 
truth—'  the  truth,  namely,  that  the  Power  which 
manifests  itself  in  consciousness  is  but  a  difter- 
ently-conditioned  form  of  the  Power  which  mani- 

82 


\ 


ON  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  RELIGION 

fests    itself    beyond    consciousness.'     In    every 
voluntary  act  the  primitive  man  recognises  'a 
source  of  energy  within  him.'      He    inevitably 
ascribes  all  changes  in  the  world  about  him  to 
the  same  kind  of  energy.    At  first  he  conceives 
this  energy  as  exercised  in  precisely  the  same  way 
as  his  own — *  as  put  forth  by  beings  like  himself.' 
With  the  development  of  thought  the  purely 
human  connotations  and  associations  gradually 
fall  away,  and  the  idea  of  objective  force  is  more 
and  more  differentiated  from  the  idea  of  force  as 
known  in  consciousness.     Yet  even  the  man  of 
science,  in  whom  this  differentiation  is  most  com- 
plete, 'is  compelled  to  symbolise  objective  force 
in  terms  of  subjective  force  from  lack  of  any 
other  symbol.'    The  implications  are  important. 
'That  internal  energy  which  in  the  experiences 
of  the  primitive  man  was  always  the  immediate 
antecedent  of  the  changes  wrought  by  him — that 
energy  which,  when  interpreting  external  changes, 
he  thought  of  along  with  those  attributes  of  a 
human  personality  connected  with  it  in  himself; 
is  the  same  energy  which,  freed  from  anthropo- 
morphic accompaniments,  is  now  figured  as  the 
cause  of  all  external  phenomena.    The  last  stage 
reached  is  recognition  of  the  truth  that  force  as 
it  exists  beyond  consciousness,  cannot  be    like 

«3 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

what  we  know  as  force  within  consciousness ;  and 
that  yet,  as  either  is  capable  of  generating  the 
other  they  must  be  different  modes  of  the  same. 
Consequently,  the  final  outcome  of  that  specula- 
tion commenced  by  the  primitive  man,  is  that 
the  Power  manifested  throughout  the  universe 
distinguished  as  material,  is  the  same  Power 
which  in  ourselves  wells  up  under  the  form  of 
consciousness.'  Thus  ■  the  final  form  of  religious 
consciousness '  is  the  ultimate  product,  not  of  a 
belief  which  was  wholly  false,  but  ■  of  a  conscious- 
ness which  at  the  outset  contained  a  germ  of 
truth  obscured  by  multitudinous  errors.'  In  the 
continued  development  of  thought  the  errors 
have  been  slowly  eliminated  and  the  underlying 

truth  disengaged. 

From  this  point  we  advance  naturally  to 
Spencer's  heroic  attempt  to  reconcile  religion  and 
science.  We  have  already  seen  that  the  ultimate 
truth  of  science  is  the  persistence  of  force,  and 
that  by  persistence  of  force  we  really  mean '  the 
persistence  of  some  Cause  which  transcends  our 
knowledge  and  conception.'  We  now  learn  that 
the  ultimate  truth  of  religion  is  the  existence  of 
such  an  inscrutable  Power.  Science  finds  incom- 
prehensible energy  behind  all  the  phenomena 
which  it  investigates.    This  consciousness  of  an 

84 


ON  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  RELIGION 

incomprehensible  energy,  'called  Omnipresent 
from  inability  to  assign  its  limits,'  is  'just  that 
consciousness  in  which  religion  dweUs.'  Science 
everywhere  leads  to  the  mystery  in  which  religion 
begins.  The  Persistent  Force  of  the  one  is  the 
Eternal  God  of  the  other.  '  Here,  then,  is  a  truth 
in  which  religions  in  general  agree  with  one 
another,  and  with  a  philosophy  antagonistic  to 
their  special  dogmas.  If  Religion  and  Science 
are  to  be  reconciled,  the  basis  of  reconcihation 
must  be  this  deepest,  widest,  and  most  certain  of 
all  facts— that  the  Power  which  the  universe 
manifests  to  us  is  inscrutable.' 

To  the  vast  majority  of  men  it  will  certainly 
appear  that  this  reconciliation  is  effected  only  by 
the  sacrifice  of  everything  they  are  accustomed 
to  consider  as  specifically  and  positively  religious. 
They  will,  moreover,  regret  that  Spencer  did  not 
push  his  argument,  as  he  might  naturaUy  have 
done,  beyond  the  purely  negative  position  in 
which  he  rests.  As  it  is,  religious  thought  and 
sentiment  are  reduced  by  him,  as  Sidgwick  put  it, 
'to  a  perfectly  indefinite  consciousness  of  the 
Unknowable,  and  the  emotion  that  accompanies 
this  peculiar  intellectual  exercise.'  That  he  was 
himself  fully  satisfied  with  this  conclusion,  and 
was  rarely  troubled  by  any  sense  of  our  common 

85 


I 

f 


HERBERT  SPENCER 

human  need  for  religious  hope  and  consolation, 
is  probably  to  be  explained  by  reference  less  to 
his  philosophy  than  to  his  temperament.  He 
was  well  aware  that '  in  the  genesis  of  a  system 
of  thought  the  emotional  nature  is  a  large  factor ; 
perhaps  as  large  a  factor  as  the  intellectual 
nature.'  Because  his  own  nature  was  deficient  on 
the  emotional  side,  he  was  able  to  accept  the  agnosti- 
cism to  which,  as  it  seemed  to  him,  his  reasoning 
committed  him,  without  any  recoil  of  feeling 
against  the  unbroken  darkness  in  which  it  left 
the  universe  enshrouded.  He  realised  indeed 
that  *  an  immense  majority '  will  resent, '  with  more 
or  less  of  indignation,'  his  proposed  substitution  of 

*  an  unthinkable  abstraction '  for  '  a  Being  towards 
whom  we  may  entertain  definite  feelings.'  He 
further  admitted,  not  only  that  current  religious 
conceptions  'are  indispensable  as  transitional 
modes  of  thought,'  but  also  that  in  all  probability 

*  under  their  most  abstract  forms,  ideas  of  this 
order  will  always  continue  to  occupy  the  back- 
ground of  consciousness.  Very  likely  there  will 
ever  remain  a  need  to  give  shape  to  that  indefinite 
sense  of  an  Ultimate  Existence,  which  forms  the 
basis  of  our  intelligence.  We  shall  always  be 
under  the  necessity  of  contemplating  it  as  some 
mode  of  being ;  that  is — of  representing  it  to  our- 

86 


ON  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  RELIGION 

selves  in  some  form  of  thought,  however  vague. 
And  we  shall  not  err  in  doing  this  so  long  as  we 
treat  every  notion  we  thus  frame  as  merely  a 
symbol.'  Science  rolls  back  the  problem  of  the 
universe,  but  it  does  not  solve  it.  A  sphere  of 
consciousness  will  thus  always  remain  which 
'rational  interpretation'  will  never  serve  to 
occupy ;  and  as  this  sphere  '  can  never  become 
an  unfilled  sphere ' — as  men  will  never  outgrow 
their  sense  of  the  final  mystery  of  things  and 
their  desire  to  penetrate  it — religion  can  never 
be  destroyed.  Yet  the  religious  progress  of  the 
race  hereafter,  as  Spencer  forecasts  it,  can  be 
scarcely  more  than  a  series  of  futile  endeavours 
after  transcendental  truth,  in  which  the  mind  of 
man,  repeatedly  baftied,  will  again  and  again  be 
driven  to  take  refuge  in  agnosticism.  '  By  con- 
tinually seeking  to  know  and  being  continually 
thrown  back  into  a  deepened  conviction  of  the 
impossibility  of  knowing,  we  may  keep  alive  our 
consciousness  that  it  is  alike  our  highest  wisdom 
and  our  highest  duty  to  regard  that  through 
which  all  things  exist  as  Unknowable.' 


^7 


CHIEF  DATES  AND  AUTHORITIES 


CHIEF  DATES  AND  AUTHORITIES 
Chronological  Table 

1820.  Herbert  Spencer  born,  April  27. 
1837.  Begins  work  as  Civil  Engineer. 

1842.  Publication  of  Letters  on  the  Proper  Sphere  of  Govern- 
ment. 
1848.  Becomes  sub-editor  of  TJie  Economist. 
1850.  Publication  of  Social  Statics. 
1850.  The  Sijstem  of  Synthetic  Philosophy  projected. 
1860.  First  Principles  commenced. 
1862.  Publication  of  First  Principles. 
1882.  Visit  to  America. 
1896.  Completion  of  the  Synthetic  Philosophy. 
1898.  Settles  at  5  Percival  Terrace,  Brighton. 
1903.  Death,  December  8. 


Brief  List  of  English  Books  dealing  with 
Spencer's  Philosophy 

Collins,  F.  H.,  An  Epitome  of  the  Synthetic  Philosophy. 
1901.     A  digest  of  the  system,  published  with  Spcncei-'s 

authority. 
Duncan,  D.,  The  Life  and  Letters  of  Herbert  Spencer.  1908. 
The  authoritative  biography  written  at  Spencer's  request. 
It  contains  (pp.  533-576)  a  most  important  essay  on  '  The 
Filiation  of  Ideas,'  left  by  Spencer  for  publication  m  this 
volume.  This  gives  the  history  of  his  theories  and  a 
*  sketch  plan'  of  his  philosophy. 

88 


/ 


FisKK,   J.,    Outlines    of    Cosmic    Philosophy^   based   07i   the 

Doctrine  of  Evohition.     2  vols.     1874.     An    elaborate 

presentation    of    evolutionary   philosophy,   founded    on 

Spencer's  principles. 
Hudson,   W.   H.,   An    Introduction   to   the  Philosophy   of 

Herbert  Spencer.     1904.     Expository  and  popular. 
Macpherson,  H.,  Herbert  Spencer:  The  Man  and  his  Work. 

1904.     Expository  and  popular. 
RoYCE,  J.,  Herbert   Spencer:  An   Estimate   and   a   Review. 

1904.     A  brief,  critical  exaniination  of  Spencer's  leading 

ideas.     Appended  is  a  chapter  of  personal  reminiscences 

by  J.  Collier, 
SiDGWiCK,  H.,  Lectures  on  the  Ethics  of  T.  H.  Green,  Mr. 

Herbert  Spencer,  and  J.  Martineau.     1902. 
SiDGWiCK,   H.,   The  Philosophy  of  Mr.   Herbert  Spencer  (in 

The  Philosophy  of  Kant  and  other  Lectures).     1905. 
SoRLEY,  W.  R.,  The  Ethics  of  Naturalism.     1904. 

The   above    three    works    contain    much    valuable 
criticism. 
Spencer,  H.,  An  Autobiography.    2  vols.    1904.    Invaluable 

as   an   intellectual  record,  and   for   the   light  which   it 

throws  upon  the  evolution  of  Spencer's  thought. 
Thomson,  J.  A.,  Herbert  Spencer  (in '  English  Men  of  Science '). 

1906.     Particularly  valuable  for  its  critical  estimate  of 

Spencer's  w^ork  as  a  biologist. 


Printed  by  T.  and  A.  Constabi.e,  Printers  to  His  Majesty 
at  the  Edinburph  University  Press 


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